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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION,
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0') (1996). This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the
Utah Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, the Honorable Michael G.
Allphin presiding, over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original
jurisdiction.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL.
A.

Is Appellant entitled to equitable relief excusing its failure to strictly

comply with the option exercise notice provisions of the subject Ground Leases based on
essentially undisputed evidence establishing that the delay in giving notice was slight,
Appellees were not prejudiced in any way by the delay, and Appellant will suffer a
significant forfeiture of its valuable leasehold interest in the absence of equitable relief?
This issue is a mixed question requiring the application of law to essentially
undisputed facts. Accordingly, the Court will need to determine, under the factors set
forth in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the degree of deference to be given to
the trial court's conclusion. See also, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998);
and Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997).
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that it was
entitled to equitable relief. [R. 4-6, 493-496, 618 p. 5]
B.

Did the trial court err in analyzing Appellant's claimed entitlement to

equitable relief by imposing a higher standard of care upon Appellant's agents because
they were "professionals"?
1

The determination of the appropriate standard of care is a question of law which is
reviewed for correctness. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317 (Utaih 1999).
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that its
agents were not grossly negligent. [R. 4-6, 493-496, 618 p. 5]
C.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant's agents were grossly

negligent in failing to provide written notice of Appellant's intention to exercise its
renewal options 150 days prior to the expiration of the Ground Leases?
This is a mixed question of law and fact for which the standard of review is
described in subparagraph A.
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that its
agents were not grossly negligent. [R. 4-6]
D.

Did the trial court err in refusing to hold that constructive knowledge of a

contractual right is sufficient for purposes of establishing the "knowledge" element of
implied waiver?
This is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness, as set forth in subparagraph
B.
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below that
Defendants waived their rights to receive notice based on constructive knowledge of such
right. [R. 5, 505-507]
E.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Appellant had not established by a

preponderance of the evidence the elements of implied waiver based on essentially
undisputed evidence?
2

This is a mixed question of law and fact which must be reviewed under the
standard described in Paragraph A.
Appellant preserved this issue for appeal based on its arguments below. [R. 5,
505-507]
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR
OTHER RULES,
None.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court

This case involves Appellant's ("U. S. Realty") request for equitable relief and a
declaratory judgment that U. S. Realty's interest as tenant in certain premises leased from
Appellees ("Defendants") has not been forfeited as a result of a delay in providing written
notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise certain lease renewal options. This matter
was tried to the bench, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin presiding, on February 23 and
24, 2000. By Memorandum Decision dated April 11, 2000, the trial court ruled that U. S.
Realty was not entitled to equitable relief because its agents were grossly negligent in
failing to provide written notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise the options 150
days prior to the expiration of the subject Ground Leases. The trial court also held that
Defendants had not waived their rights to receive written notice.
B,

Statement of Facts.
1.

U. S. Realty is Lessee and Defendants are Lessors under two Ground

Leases for contiguous parcels of real property located at the intersection of 1-15 and 2600

3

South in Woods Cross, Utah. The Ground Leases were executed in 1972 by U.S.
Realty's predecessor in interest, as tenant, and Defendants, as landlords. U. S. Realty's
predecessor subsequently constructed a large commercial complex on the previously
undeveloped real property, which is now identified as the Woods Cross K-Mart Center
(the "K-Mart Center"). The Ground Lease terms were 25 years with six additional 5-year
options for extension. [R. 518, Exhs. P-l and P-2]
2.

At or about the time of entering into the Ground Leases, Defendants

subordinated their interests in the real property to mortgages incurred by U.S. Realty's
predecessor in interest for the purpose of developing the leased premises and constructing
the K-Mart Center. [R. 518, Exhs. P-IO-(B) and (C)]
3.

The pertinent terms of the Ground Leases provide that:
(a)

Defendants shall be paid a base annual rent, in advance,

together with a percentage override from certain rents received from U. S. Realty's
subtenants of the K-Mart Center. [Exhs. P-l and P-2, ^ 3] Defendants received more
than $930,298 in ground rents during the initial 25 year terms of the Ground Leases.
(b)

U.S. Realty is responsible for the payment of all taxes,

assessments, utilities (water, electricity, gas, telephone, sewer, and others) ffl 4(a)],
insurance ft[ 7(b)], maintenance fl[ 10], and all costs of construction and improvements fl[
6]. All such costs have been paid by U.S. Realty and its predecessors in interest. No
costs were incurred by the Defendants.

4

(c)

Upon termination of the Ground Leases, the ownership of all

improvements on the property, including the buildings thereon, revert to the Defendants.
[Exhs. land 2,^j 10 and 17]
(d)

In the event of condemnation of any part of the property

demised under the Ground Leases after construction of buildings and improvements
thereon, U.S. Really is entitled to a just portion of the damages awarded in the
condemnation proceeding, as well as a reduction in ground rent in future periods. [Exhs.
1 and 2, H 15]
(e)

The original terms of both Ground Leases expired on July 31,

1998. However, the Ground Leases grant U.S. Really a number of options to extend the
terms of each Lease. Paragraph 22 of both Leases provides, in part, that:
Tenant shall have the following options to extend the term of
this Lease, if at the time of extension of the option, the tenant is
not in default hereunder:
(i) An option to extend the term for an additional period
of five years from and after the expiration of the initial lease
term.
(ii) If such option is exercised, tenant shall have five
additional successive options to renew this lease, each for a term
of five years and each option is conditioned upon the exercise of
the renewal option immediately preceding.
(iii) All the options herein granted shall be exercised by
notice in writing to Landlord given not later than 150 days prior
to the expiration of the then-existing lease term, and in the
manner hereinafter provided. A total of six successive five-year
options were provided.

5

4.

U.S. Realty acquired its leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center by

assignment on October 15, 1986 for a total purchase price of $2,045,259. [Exh. P-6].
Subsequent to this assignment, U. S. Realty has paid the annual Ground Lease payments
to Defendants every year, and has also paid certain mortgage payments for debt incurred
to fund construction of the improvements on the property.

As of the date of the

expiration of the original Lease term, July 31, 1998, U. S. Realty had not yet recouped its
original investment in the K-Mart Center. [R. 518, 616 pp. 17, 23-28, 31, and R. 617 p.
235]
5.

After acquiring the K-Mart Center, U. S. Realty employed various

agents to manage the Center. In October 1995, direct management of U. S. Realty's
leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center was transferred from Winding Brook Co. to
Garden Homes Group, with Mr. Mark Hoffman as the principal asset manager. The
principal of Winding Brook Co., Mr. Jacob Burstyn, was also a general partner in U.S.
Realty. Immediately prior to Garden Homes Group assuming management of the K-Mart
Center, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Phil Shiffman met with Mr. Burstyn and obtained from
him all the documents in Winding Brook's possession relating to the K-Mart Center,
including copies of the Ground Leases, Lease Abstracts, tenant leases, maintenance files,
accounting statements, bank statements, computer data and other records. Hoffman and
Shiffman obtained five large boxes of documents relating to the K-Mart Center from
Burstyn at that time. [R. 519, 616 pp. 17, 20 and 21]
6.

The Lease Abstracts obtained from Winding Brook Co. served as a

working digest or summary of the leases and were utilized in the day-to-day management
6

of the K-Mart Center. These Lease Abstracts had been used to manage the Leases since
U. S. Realty acquired the K-Mart Center in 1986. [R. 519, 616 pp. 22, 67, 112, and Exh.
P-11(A)-(D)]
7.

At the time Mark Hoffman assumed management responsibilities in

1995, the K-Mart Center was occupied by K-Mart, Mac Frugal's and Pizza Hut. One
vacant space was later leased to Heartland Paper Company. [Exhs. P-26, 27, 28, 29]
8.

As the asset manager for U.S. Realty, Mark Hoffman was

responsible for maintenance of the K-Mart Center, including management of outside
contractors for the parking lot, roofs and building repairs. He was also responsible to
make all payables, coordinate with accountants, hire outside local legal counsel when
needed, handle financing and leasing of space in the Center, make periodic site
inspections, and supervise personnel who assisted him. Although he is an attorney, Mr.
Hoffman did not practice law during the time he worked as the asset manager of the KMart Center. [R. 616 pp. 18, 19, 127]
9.

Mr. Phil Shiffman is an accountant who has been employed by

Garden Homes Group since 1992. Shiffman worked for Hoffman in the day-to-day
management of U.S. Realty's properties, including the K-Mart Center. Shiffman handled
the daily administration of U. S. Realty's Leases with its tenants, including collection of
rents and the payment of taxes, ground rent, and insurance, and other matters requiring
affirmative acts by U.S. Realty concerning the properties. Mr. Shiffman did not have any
experience with ground leases prior to the K-Mart Center since U. S. Realty generally

7

owns the land and buildings comprising its shopping centers. [R. 616 pp. 29, 158, 159,
169]
10.

After the documents pertaining to the K-Mart Center were obtained

by Garden Homes Group from Winding Brook, Shiftman was assigned to review the
Lease Abstracts and enter the information contained therein into U. S. Realty's computer
system. In completing this task, Shiffinan relied exclusively on the Abstracts obtained
from Winding Brook and did not review the Leases. Shiffinan also entered the relevant
information and Lease deadlines identified in the Abstracts into a daily diary he kept for
cross-reference purposes and used as a "tickler" system to alert him to significant dates.
[R. 616 pp. 160, 161, 164]
11.

After Garden Homes Group took over in October 1995, the daily

system used for management of U.S. Realty's properties, including the K-Mart Center,
was by reference to the information contained in the Lease Abstracts. Mark Hoffman
relied upon Phil Shiffinan to provide him with notice of dates requiring action by U. S.
Realty under the Leases. [R. 616 pp. 22, 45, 46, 114]
12.

The use of Lease Abstracts is an effective and efficient method for

managing the day-to-day requirements of leased properties. Since the Lease Abstracts
had been prepared by a partner in U.S. Realty whose management had preceded that of
Mark Hoffman for several years without any problems, Hoffman felt confident that the
Abstracts were complete, accurate and reliable. [R. 616 pp. 97, 98, 121]
13.

In 1996, the Utah Department of Transportation notified the

Defendants and U.S. Realty of UDOT's intention to condemn a part of the subject
8

property for construction of an access road to Interstate 15. At that time, Mark Hoffman
retrieved and reviewed the provisions of the Ground Leases regarding U.S. Realty's
rights upon condemnation. [Exhs. P-l and P-2 ^ 15] Mark Hoffman concluded that U. S.
Realty had a right to participate in any severance damages awarded and was entitled to a
future pro-rata reduction in rent paid to Defendants. [R. 520, 616 pp. 37-40]
14.

Although there were a series of communications with the State of

Utah regarding settlement of the condemnation during 1996 and 1997, Mark Hoffman
was not willing to complete an agreement to resolve the condemnation action until
construction was substantially complete. [R. 616 pp. 54, 55, Exh. P-12 A&B]
15.

Condemnation actions were filed by UDOT in March 1997, naming

Defendants and U. S. Realty as defendants. Construction was delayed by UDOT from
1997 until February 1998. [R. 520, 616 pp. 54, 55]
16.

A condemnation settlement proposal was discussed by UDOT, U. S.

Realty and Defendants which provided for future reductions in the rents to be paid to
Defendants by U.S. Realty during the option terms of the Ground Leases in exchange for
a release of U.S. Realty's claims for any part of the damages awarded in the
condemnation proceeding. [Exh. P-12 A&B] The Defendants were agreeable to and
orally accepted this resolution.

Based on this agreement, U. S. Realty subsequently

released its interests in the condemnation actions. The trial court expressly found that the
parties reached an agreement to settle the condemnation actions between April 22, 1998,
and July 15, 1998. [R. 521, 522, 616 pp. 63, 96, 97, 180, 182, 202, 203, 205, Exhs. P12(A) and (B), P-22, P-23]
9

17.

On April 17, 1998, after determining that the construction resulting

from the condemnation was proceeding appropriately, Mark Hoffman reviewed the terms
of the Ground Leases dealing with the option periods in order to calculate the adjustments
that needed to be made in the future ground rents as a result of the parties' oral settlement
of the condemnation action. Mark Hoffman's objective at that time was to reduce the
parties' oral agreement to writing. Upon reviewing Exhs. P-l and P-2, ^ 22, Mark
Hoffman first learned that the Ground Leases required U.S. Realty to give 150 days'
written notice prior to the end of the lease term to exercise its options to renew those
Leases. [R. 520, 521, 616 pp. 63, 64, 81, 82, Exh. P-17(A) and (B)]
18.

The initial lease terms ended July 31, 1998. The option notice date

was therefore March 3, 1998. Upon discovery of the notice requirement, Mark Hoffman
asked Phil Shiffman why he had not given timely notice of the date for exercise of the
option. Phil Shiffman verified that he did not have the date in his tickler system, nor was
this information contained in the Lease Abstracts obtained from Winding Brook. [Exh.
P-l 1] Neither Hoffman nor Shiffman was aware of this omission prior to April 17, 1998.
Because the date was not in the tickler system, there was nothing to alert Shiffman to
refer to the Lease Abstracts. [R. 616 pp. 64, 65, 167, Exhs. P-l and P-2]
19.

On April 17, 1998, Mark Hoffman sent certified return receipt letters

to Defendants, giving notice of U.S. Realty's exercise of its options. These letters were
received by Defendants on April 22, 1998, but were simply placed in a file. Neither
defendant knew of or had any concern about option renewal notices until Mr. George
Fadel, their attorney, requested them to retrieve and review the letters on or about July
10

15, 1998. U. S. Realty was in Ml compliance with the Ground Leases at the time these
notices were provided. [R. 616 pp. 61, 69, 177-179, 204, and 617 pp. 333-334, Exh. P13-(A) and (B)]
20.

During the period from March 3, 1998, until July 15, 1998:
(a)

Defendants did not communicate to U.S. Realty that they

deemed the April 17, 1998, notices to be defective in providing 106 days' notice instead
of 150 days' notice, or were deficient in any other manner.
(b)

Defendants were in agreement with the settlement of the

condemnation action under terms whereby U.S. Realty gave up any claims to the
condemnation award in exchange for ground rent reductions during the option periods.
(c)

Defendants

requested Mark Hoffman

to contact their

attorney, Mr. George Fadel, and prepare necessary paperwork to memorialize the
settlement of the condemnation action.
(d)

Pursuant to Defendants' requests, U.S. Realty paid expenses

extending into the first option period for sewer assessments and a slope easement, which
were accepted by Defendants without reservation. [R. 521, 522, 616 pp. 70, 76-82, 91,
154, and R. 617 p. 335]
21.

On or about July 13, 1998, Mr. Hoffman contacted Mr. Fadel,

attorney for Defendants, and discussed the agreement settling the condemnation actions.
Mr. Fadel requested Mr. Hoffman to prepare the paperwork to reflect the agreement for
future rent reductions in the option periods of the Ground Leases and the release by U.S.

11

Realty of its claims to any of the condemnation proceeds, which Hoffman immediately
began to draft. [R. 616 pp. 81, 82]
22.

On July 15 and 17, 1998, more than three months after Mr.

Hoffman's April 17, 1998 notices and only two weeks prior to the expiration of the
original Lease terms, Defendants sent letters to U.S. Realty for the first time indicating
that they deemed U.S. Realty's exercise of the option to have been untimely and declared
the Ground Leases terminated as of July 31, 1998.

The Security Investment letter

demanded more than ten times the amount of the ground rent required under the terms of
the Lease to be paid in the option period if U. S. Realty wished to continue its occupancy.
[R. 521, 522, Exhs. P-18 and 19]
23.

The timing of Mark Hoffman's April 17, 1998, renewal notices was

of no consequence to Defendants since they were unaware of even receiving the notices
until shortly before the original Lease terms expired. Defendants had taken no action due
to the delayed notices since they were not even expecting any notice. Defendants did not
incur any liabilities, obligations or responsibilities regarding the management, operation,
maintenance, repair, or expenses of the K-Mart Center due to the delay. [R. 521, 616 pp.
182-186, 195-200, and R. 617 pp. 328-330, 337]
24.

None of the Defendants reviewed or discussed the April 17, 1998

notices prior to July 15, 1998. The Defendants did not communicate to U.S. Realty that
U.S. Realty had no standing or claims to compensation in the condemnation action
because of any failure by U.S. Realty to give 150 day written notice exercising the

12

option, nor were any motions filed in the condemnation proceedings to dismiss U.S.
Realty's claims. [R. 521, 616 pp. 182-186, 195-200, and R. 617 pp. 328-330, 337]
25.

The omission of the date for exercise of the options in the Ground

Leases is the only error that has occurred in any of the Lease Abstracts for all of the
properties transferred to Mark Hoffman for management from Winding Brook Co. in
1995. [R. 520, 521, 616 pp. 99, 166]
26.

Defendants provided no testimony, expert or otherwise, that reliance

on Lease Abstracts constituted a departure from any standard of care applicable to
commercial real estate property managers, much less an extreme departure constituting
gross negligence.
27.

On July 20, 1998, U. S. Realty tendered to Defendants the full

ground rent for the option period required under the Leases, which was refused. [R. 616
pp. 88, 89, Exh. 16-(A) and (B)]
28.

As of August 1, 1998, the beginning of the first option period, U. S.

Realty's leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center, appraised at market value, was worth at
least $1,300,000. [R. 617 pp. 301, 302, Exh. 30]
29.

If U. S. Realty's tenancy is terminated effective July 31, 1998, U. S.

Realty will forfeit more than $1,700,000, reduced to present value, in net income
reasonably expected to be derived from the K-Mart Center during the option periods. [R.
617 pp. 244, 245, Exh. 25]
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V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT,
In Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court

established that strict compliance with lease option renewal provisions may be equitably
excused under certain instances. This case clearly merits such relief. U. S. Realty's 25year Ground Leases, with six five-year options for extension, called for exercise of each
option by 150 days' written notice to Defendants. Because of an error in U. S. Realty's
Lease Abstract/tickler system, which had always worked satisfactorily before, U. S.
Realty provided the requisite notice, but did so 106 days before the expiration of the
initial term, or 44 days late. Defendants admittedly paid no attention whatsoever to the
date of receipt of these notices, and operated on the assumption that the Leases had been
renewed.
Defendants even requested that U. S. Realty pay sewer charges which would only
be due if the option had been exercised. Indeed, the trial court found that U. S. Realty and
Defendants actually entered into an agreement, after the renewal notices were received,
resolving pending condemnation proceedings by U. S. Realty's agreement to waive any
right to the condemnation proceeds in exchange for rent reductions during the option
term. Nevertheless, approximately two weeks before the original term was to have
expired, Defendants' attorney read the Lease provisions and ascertained that notice had
been given late, at which point Defendants pounced upon this fact - which had been of
no practical consequence to them whatsoever - as a basis for declaring the Ground
Leases terminated, and seeking ,to extract from U. S. Realty more than 10 times the rent
provided for in the Ground Leases.
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Surprisingly, the trial court refused to grant equitable relief, determining that
because U. S. Realty's property managers were "professionals," their reliance upon the
Lease Abstracts, rather than the actual Leases, constituted gross negligence of such a
shocking degree as to require the forfeiture of U.S. Realty's leasehold interest, the present
value of which exceeds $1,300,000. Even more surprisingly, the trial court actually
rewarded Defendants for their own deliberate indifference to the renewal notices and
related Lease provisions by holding that the agreement to resolve the condemnation
proceedings, on terms that could only be carried out if there had been an effective
renewal, did not constitute waiver because Defendants' deliberate ignorance equated to
an absence of "actual knowledge" of their rights to receive notice.
Presumably because the issue of equitable relief was not directly before the Court
in Geisdorf, the Court did not expand on the required elements of equitable relief in
option renewal cases. There is no other Utah case addressing this issue, although Courts
from numerous other jurisdictions, including Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Texas, and Washington, have adopted the following standard:
A lessee may be excused from strict compliance when the
lessee's conduct in failing to comply was not due to willful
or gross negligence but was, rather, the result of an honest
and justifiable mistake. Where the failure to comply is the
result of mere negligence, equitable relief should be granted
where the delay in providing written notice has been slight,
the loss to the lessor is small and to refuse equitable relief
would result in unconscionable hardship to lessee.
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The trial court adopted and purported to apply this legal standard to the evidence
at trial, but erred in concluding that U. S. Realty's agents were grossly negligent, thus
precluding equitable relief. U. S. Realty contends that the evidence necessary to resolve
its claim for equitable relief is virtually undisputed. Accordingly, the Court should apply
minimal deference to the trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were grossly
negligent. The trial court concluded that the distinction between gross negligence and
ordinary negligence was difficult under these facts, but then imposed a higher standard of
care upon U. S. Realty's agents because they were "professionals." In this case, an
enhanced standard should not apply because Mr. Hoffman, an attorney, and Mr.
Shiftman, an accountant, were acting as property managers for U.S. Realty, not members
of their professions. As such, Hoffman and Shiffman should be held to the same standard
as any other property manager, not an enhanced legal standard based solely on their
professions.
Under the appropriate legal standards, Hoffman's and Shiffman's reliance on the
Lease Abstracts that had been prepared by the prior management company to alert them
to significant dates, such as option renewal dates, was the result of an honest and
justifiable mistake or, at worst, mere negligence. In fact, their conduct here, a misplaced
reliance on an inaccurate Lease Abstract, is far less culpable than that uniformly held as
providing a basis for equitable relief by other courts. The undisputed evidence clearly
establishes all elements entitling U. S. Realty to equitable relief since the delay in
providing notice was slight, defendants would not be prejudiced by the Court's granting
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of equitable relief, and to refuse to grant equitable relief to U. S. Realty would result in an
unconscionable hardship requiring the forfeiture of an asset worth at least $1,300,000.
U. S. Realty also contends Defendants' assertions of untimeliness as to the option
renewal notices are barred by the doctrine of implied waiver. In Geisdorf, the Utah
Supreme Court held that implied waiver must be analyzed under the totality of the
circumstances. 972 P.2d at 73, n. 6. In this instance, the trial court refused to find
implied waiver of Defendants' rights to receive written notice of U. S. Realty's intention
to exercise its options based substantially on the theory that Defendants had no actual
knowledge of their right to receive such notice. U. S. Realty contends that constructive
notice of this right is legally sufficient under these circumstances, and that the right to
receive the option renewal notice was impliedly waived when all parties agreed to the
condemnation settlement and Defendants demanded that U. S. Realty pay the sewer bill
and slope easement payments extending into the option period after the notices from U.S.
Realty had been received.
VI.

DETAILED ARGUMENT,
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding U. S. Realty's Agents were

Grossly Negligent, Precluding Equitable Relief, The trial court purported to adopt and
apply the following legal standard to the evidence produced at trial: equitable relief may
be granted where the lessee's failure to strictly comply with the option renewal notice
provision was not due to willful or gross negligence, but was rather the result of an
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honest or justifiable mistake.1 [Memorandum Decision, p. 8] U. S. Realty contends the
trial court erred in applying this standard to the present facts for the following reasons:
(1) the trial court improperly held U. S. Realty's managing agents to a higher standard of
care for the purposes of the required negligence/mistake analysis because they are
"professionals"; and (2) the trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were
grossly negligent is not supported by sufficient, competent evidence. As discussed
below, the numerous cases throughout the country purporting to apply the equitable relief
standard have never drawn a distinction between "professionals" and "nonprofessionals," but have granted equitable relief based on conduct far more culpable than
that of U.S. Realty.
1.

Applicable legal standard. In Geisdorf, the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Indeed, there are instances in which deviation from
strict compliance [with the terms of the Lease
regarding exercise of options] may be equitably
excused. [Citation omitted] . . . . Some instances in
which an optionee may be excused from strict
compliance include when the optionee's conduct in
failing to comply was not due to willful or gross
negligence on the part of the optionee, but was rather
the result of an honest and justifiable mistake . . . .
Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S.W. 2nd 29 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
M a t 71.

1

Since the trial court held that U. S. Realty was not entitled to equitable relief due to gross negligence,
the trial court did not analyze or evaluate the requirements of equitable relief based upon a finding of
simple negligence.
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Although there are no subsequent Utah cases applying the above rule, the Court
appears to have primarily relied upon Texas law by its citation to Cattle Feeders. The
development of this standard for equitable relief under similar facts by Texas courts is
helpful here. For example, Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W. 2d 265 (Tex. 1939) is cited in Cattle
Feeders as the genesis of equitable relief in option exercise cases. The Jones court
expressly adopts the analysis of the Connecticut Supreme Court in F.B. Fountain v. Stein,
which is discussed below, as the appropriate standard in Texas. Jones, 130 S.W. 2d at
272-73. This holding was later confirmed by the Texas Court of Appeals in Inn of Hills,
Ltd. v. Schulger & Kaiser, 723 S.W. 2d 299, 301 (Tex. App. 1987):
In cases of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition
precedent of a lease, which do not fall within accident
or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay has been
slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to
grant relief would result in such hardship to the tenant
as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the
condition precedent of the lease.
Id. (citing Jones). U. S. Realty contends the above cases establish the standard for
equitable relief under Utah law.
In analyzing the trial court's decision, the Court must also determine the
appropriate standard of review. The trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents
were grossly negligent and the trial court's refusal to grant equitable relief are mixed
questions requiring application of the law to the facts. Under these circumstances, the
Court should apply minimal deference to the trial court's conclusions under State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and subsequent cases following this approach. Applying the
factors set forth in Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998), a minimally
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deferential standard of review should be employed because: (1) the legal standards for
gross negligence and equitable relief under these circumstances, while not clearly
established under prior Utah law, do not necessarily implicate complex and varying fact
situations; (2) the standards for gross negligence and equitable relief are clearly capable
of definitive articulation as to relevant legal factors to be applied by the Appellate Court;
and (3) the trial court did not make any witness credibility findings since all of the
relevant facts are essentially undisputed.
Because issues involving standards of care are legal questions, the trial
court's imposition of a higher standard on U. S. Realty's agents because they are
"professionals" is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Id.
2.

U. S. Realty is entitled to equitable relief under the appropriate

legal standard. There is an abundance of precedent from other jurisdictions where
courts have granted equitable relief to tenants faced with nearly identical facts to those
now before the Court. The seminal case on the issue appears to be F.B. Fountain Co. v.
Stein, 118 A. 47 (Conn. 1922). In Fountain, a commercial tenant, after investing
substantial sums improving the leased premises, failed to exercise its option to renew
within the 30-day notice period.

In remanding the matter for a new trial for the

previously unsuccessful tenant, the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the following
rule:
We think the better rule to be that, in cases of willful or gross
negligence in failing to fulfill a condition precedent of a lease,
equity will never relieve. But in cases of mere neglect in
fulfilling the condition precedent of a lease, which do not fall
within accident or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay
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has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to
grant relief would result in such hardship to the tenant as to
make it unconscionable to enforce literally the condition
precedent of the lease.
Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
For more then 75 years the majority of courts around the country have
consistently applied the equitable principles espoused in Fountain and its progeny to
relieve tenants from their failure to timely exercise options to renew.

In Fleming

Companies, Inc. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 818 P.2d 813 (Kan. App. 1991), a case cited
in Geisdorf, the corporate tenant under a 30 year lease was required to serve written
notice of its intention to exercise its renewal option at least one year before the expiration
of the initial lease term. However, the tenant failed to provide notice in a timely manner
due to the termination of its assigned employee. Immediately upon discovering this
delinquency the tenant provided written notice, albeit after the time to do so had expired.
Id. at 814-15.

Following the "majority of jurisdictions in the application of equitable

principles," the court relieved the tenant from its delinquency. Id. at 817.
The court expressly found that: (1) the tenant's failure to give notice was
not the result of intentional, willful or grossly negligent behavior; (2) the tenant stood to
lose substantial improvements it had made in the property, presumably with the intention
of exercising the option; and (3) as a result of the tenant's failure to give timely notice,
the landlord did not change its position in any significant way and was not prejudiced
thereby. Based on these facts, the court held that:
To argue [the tenant] should pay more rent because the
property is now worth more on the open market due to [the
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tenant's] own efforts [to improve the property] is inequitable .
. . . [The landlord] made no significant change in reliance on
the missed deadline; it did not actively seek to lease or sell
the property to a third party. [The landlord] most likely
intended all along to simply allow the deadline for renewal to
pass then renegotiate with [the tenant] for a higher rental rate,
armed with the club of termination of the lease and forfeiture
of the very substantial improvements should [the tenant]
refuse. Also, [the landlord] argues for the sanctity of
contracts and the need for judicial respect of their bargainedfor terms; yet it clearly wants to avoid the rental rate for the
renewal period as expressed in the original contract between
the parties.
Id. at 820-21.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, citing the "modern rule" followed by
many other jurisdictions, also relieved a commercial tenant from its failure to promptly
exercise a renewal option under similar facts. In Trollen v. Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645
(Minn. 1979), the lessee failed to timely exercise his option to renew simply because he
was "unaware of the timing." Id. at 647. The court nonetheless found in favor of the
lessee because there was no evidence that his conduct was willful or grossly negligent,
the delay was only two months under a six month prior notice requirement, the landlord
had taken no action to its detriment as a result of the delay, and the lessee would suffer
severe economic hardship if the lease was lost due to the economic impacts of having to
relocate his business. Id. at 648.
In J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1977), the New York Court of Appeals held that a delinquent tenant was entitled
to equitable relief even though the tenant was unaware of the deadline because it
negligently failed to obtain a copy of the appropriate lease documents after receiving an

assignment of the lease. The tenant had made improvements in the premises at a cost of
$55,000, and the landlord had previously demanded payment of real property taxes which
extended into the option period. The court refused to permit termination of the lease as it
would create "a forfeiture and the gravity of the loss is certainly out of all proportion to
the gravity of the fault." Id. at 1317-18.
The Ohio Court of Appeals also relieved a tenant from the consequences of
its failure to give timely notice to exercise an option where the tenant had simply misread
its own lease digest. Ward v. Washington Distr., Inc. , 425 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1980). Applying the "majority rule," the court held that ["e]ven when there is an
absence of an honest mistake by the lessee, where the lessee has made valuable
improvements to the leased premises, the lessee should not be denied equitable relief
from his own neglect or inadvertence if a forfeiture of such improvements would result provided there is no prejudice to the landlord." Id. at 424 (citations omitted). Since the
tenant stood to lose the benefit of $72,000 worth of unamortized lease improvements, the
court held that the tenant was entitled to equitable relief. Id.
Finally, in Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 744 S.W. 2d 735 (Ark. App.
1988), the Arkansas Court of Appeals recognized that equitable relief is warranted if "it
is shown that the lessor has not changed his position or otherwise been prejudiced by the
delay, and . . . the enforcement of the [option notice] covenant will result in undue and
inequitable hardship to the tenant." Id. at 737 (citations omitted). The court then
enumerated the factors to be considered in this analysis: (1) the cause and length of the
tenant's delay in giving notice; (2) the duration of the lease as contemplated by the
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parties; (3) the financial consequences of enforcement to both parties; and (4) if the
tenant's valuable leasehold improvements become the property of the landlord upon
termination of the lease. Id. at 738. The court recognized that this determination turns
not on a single factor but on the balancing of the equities between the parties, particularly
the economic consequences to both sides if the option notice term is enforced. Id. at 738.
The above cases setting forth the majority rule in the United States
demonstrate that equitable relief is the remedy adopted by most Courts to address the
current claims. See also, e.g., Car-X Serv. Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller, 927 F. 2d 511,
515 (10th Cir. 1991) (tenant entitled to equitable relief under Kansas law); Aickin v.
Ocean View Inv. Co., Inc., 935 P.2d 992, 1001 (Hawaii 1997) (equitable principles apply
to preserve tenant's leasehold interest even though required six-months' notice was
provided only two months before the end of a ten-year lease); Sosanie v. Pernetti
Holding Corp., 279 A.2d 904, 906-8 (N.J. 1971) (tenant entitled to equitable relief where
substantial harm would result if tenant is forced to relocate, landlord did not change
position in reliance on delay in providing notice, failure to give notice was based on
honest mistake as tenant had simply forgotten the date of the deadline, and landlord
expected the renewal and had made no other plans for the leased space); Inn of the Hills
v. Schulgen & Kaiser, 723 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (equity will relieve
tenant from its failure to provide timely notice to exercise an option where the delay has
been slight, the loss to lessor small, and strict enforcement of the provision would result
in such hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable); Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404
A.2d 1106, 1107-09 (N.H. 1979) (adopting "majority rule" in New Hampshire under
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similar facts); Holmes Regional Enter., Inc. v. Advanced Med. Diagnostics Corp., 582
So.2d 822 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming equitable relief to tenant even though tenant
had given tardy notice of its intention to exercise option); and Benetti v. Kishner, 558
P.2d 537, 538-39) (Nev. 1977) (special circumstances may warrant equitable relief to
prevent forfeiture if tenant erroneously thought notice to renew was not necessary and no
circumstances intervened before notice was given to make relief inequitable).
The evidence here is clear, essentially undisputed, and entirely consistent
with those factors leading the courts to grant equitable relief to the tenants in the above
cases. It is clear that U.S. Realty's failure to give timely notice was not deliberate or
intentional. Rather, it resulted from an honest and justifiable mistake. The failure to give
timely notice was the result of a singular event of misplaced reliance under circumstances
where reliance on Lease Abstracts was reasonable and justifiable. The K-Mart Center
had been managed for years by a partner of U. S. Realty based on the Lease Abstracts
without incident, and this error was the only one in the Abstracts.
The delay in giving notice was slight under the circumstances of 25-year
leases. More importantly, this delay was of absolutely no consequence to anyone. The
notices were a matter of complete indifference to Defendants, who were not even aware
of their entitlement to notice. Even though the notices were sent by certified mail, return
receipt requested, the Defendants paid no attention to the notices when they arrived.
Indeed, Defendants took no actions whatsoever to their detriment based on this delay.
Defendants continued up to the very end of the term of the Ground Leases to request and
receive payments of K-Mart Center expenses by U. S. Realty extending into the first
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option period of the Ground Leases. Since U.S. Realty had already paid the ground rent
through July 31, 1998, the Defendants also reached an agreement with U.S. Realty in the
condemnation actions whereby U. S. Realty would receive reductions of the ground rents
during future option periods in exchange for U. S. Realty's waiving its claims to part of
the damages awarded in the condemnation, a sum in excess of $427,000. At the same
time, Defendants did nothing to prepare to take over management of the K-Mart Center
in the event U.S. Realty departed on July 31, 1998.
The evidence is likewise clear that U.S. Realty will suffer a severe
economic forfeiture if the equitable relief sought is not granted. The uncontroverted
testimony established the appraised fair market value of U.S. Realty's leasehold interests
as of August 1, 1998 is $1.3 million. Further, as of August 1, 1998, U.S. Realty had not
even recouped its original investment in the property and is still carrying a net loss from
operations since 1986. A positive net profit approximating $1.7 million at present value
can be reasonably expected to be earned by U. S. Realty from its operation of the K-Mart
Center during the option periods. The Defendants, on the other hand, without incurring
any investment or operating risks whatsoever, have received over $930,000 from the
ground lease payments during the term of the Lease. All of this evidence is undisputed.
Equity is intended to prevent unconscionable results, which occur when "no
decent, fair minded person would view the ensuing result without being possessed with a
profound sense of injustice." Resource Mngmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028,
1041 (Utah 1985).

It would indeed be unconscionable for U.S. Realty to lose its

significant investment in this property just as its risks are beginning to show a profit
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based on a short delay in giving notice which was of no practical significance
whatsoever.
3.

The trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were

grossly negligent and the legal standard employed relating thereto are erroneous.
The trial court did not find that U.S. Realty had failed to meet the criteria
for equitable relief set forth above. Instead, the trial court, without reference to any of the
multiple cases which have discussed those criteria, denied all relief and enforced the
forfeiture of U. S. Realty's interest based upon the determination that the failure on the
part of U.S. Realty to give notice was the result, not of an honest mistake or of mere
neglect, but of gross negligence.

The court's stated theory was that because Mark

Hoffman and Phil Shiffman are "professionals," they should have read the Lease
Agreement rather than relying upon Lease Abstracts or a tickler system. The trial court
purported to apply a "sliding scale" approach whereby negligence became "gross" at
some completely indeterminate point. As a review of the case law makes clear, such a
sliding scale approach with an enhanced legal standard in this context is wholly
inappropriate.
Gross negligence has been defined as "the want of even slight or scant care
- the failure to exercise that care which even a careless person would use - an utter lack of
care." W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 34 at 187 (3rd Ed. 1964). See also Atkin Wright
& Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985). "Willful"
negligence is an aggravated form of misconduct, differing in quality from an ordinary
lack of care in that the actor must be aware that his conduct will probably result in injury.
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See Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 900 (Utah 1990). On the other hand,
mistake is defined as:
An unintentional act, omission or error arising from
ignorance, surprise, imposition or misplaced
confidence.
Black's Law Dictionary 903 (5th Ed. 1979).
The first legal error in the trial court's analysis of the above distinctions
was its holding that U. S. Realty's agents, Hoffman and Shiftman, had to comply with a
higher standard of care simply because they are "professionals." Although individuals
engaged in rendering services in a trade or profession, such as lawyers and accountants,
are generally required to exercise the skill and knowledge of those normally possessed by
members of that profession, Hoffman (an attorney) and Shiffman (an accountant) were
not acting as professionals on behalf of U. S. Realty. Rather, it is undisputed that
Hoffman and Shiffman were acting as property managers. Hoffman specifically testified
that he was not practicing law while employed with Garden Homes Group. Accordingly,
the Court erred in requiring a higher standard of care and conduct by them. An expanded
standard of care for professionals applies only when they have undertaken to render
services in their profession. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299(a), cmt (b) (1977).
Applying an inappropriate and more stringent legal standard of care is of
great significance in this case. As the trial court acknowledged, the facts of this case
made it difficult for the court to simply conclude that U. S. Realty was willfully or
grossly negligent, or that U. S. Realty's agents were merely negligent. [Memorandum
Decision, p. 8] The higher standard of care was employed by the trial court to tip the
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scales against U. S. Realty and improperly conclude U. S. Realty's agents were grossly
negligent, a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence under an appropriate legal
standard.
The Court's application of its gross negligence standard is also erroneous.
In deciding whether equitable relief is to be granted, courts focus, first and foremost, on
whether the criteria for such relief have been met. If these tests are satisfied, courts spend
little time in attempting to draw fine distinctions between "negligence" and "gross
negligence," no doubt recognizing that ultimately the test should be whether in the
absence of equitable relief "the gravity of the loss" will be "out of all proportion to the
gravity of the fault." J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., supra, 366 N.E.2d
at 1317-18. Accordingly, it is only where the tenant's conduct is truly culpable, and not
just negligent, that courts will consider denying equitable relief where all of the other
criteria are met.
Indeed, if the trial court's "sliding scale" approach were to be utilized, the
denial of equitable relief would be far more the rule than the exception, since it could
virtually always be said that a tenant whose very livelihood is dependent upon the timely
exercise of a renewal option should be held to a "high" standard in terms of making
certain that the option is properly exercised, and has been "grossly negligent" in failing to
give such an important matter the proper attention. In light of the fact, however, that one
of the criteria for granting relief is the extent of the forfeiture - that is, the extent of the
significance of the leasehold interest to the tenant - the entire analysis would be on a
collision course with itself, since the very criteria for granting relief would also furnish
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the basis for denying that relief by elevating the "negligence" to "gross negligence"
virtually as a matter of course, in light of the important of the interest involved.
The error in the trial court's approach is clear from the facts of the cases,
previously discussed above, in which equitable relief was granted. As will readily be
seen, the degree of negligence in these cases is certainly not less than the mistake or
negligence that was present here, and in most cases, was considerably more culpable.
Indeed, a review of the facts of those cases (arranged alphabetically by jurisdiction)
makes the erroneous nature of the trial court's reasoning obvious.
Initially, in Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., supra, the tenant was engaged in
negotiations with respect to certain disputes with the landlord. Although the tenant was
aware of the deadline for exercising the option to renew, it intentionally refrained from
doing so in the belief that exercising the renewal would prejudice its position. Although
the tenant in this case had not acted negligently at all, but, in fact, intentionally, the
Arkansas court nevertheless granted equitable relief, pointing out that those cases
throughout the country granting such relief turned "not on a single factor but on the
balancing of the equities between the parties, i.e., the extent to which the lessor has
changed his position or otherwise been damaged, and the extent to which enforcement of
the covenant would be an unconscionable hardship on the tenant." 744 S.W.2d at 738.
In F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, supra, as best as can be determined, the
tenant merely "forgot" to exercise the option to renew. Characterizing the failure as
"mere forgetfulness which at most is negligence," the Connecticut court stated "that
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nothing short of willful, that is, voluntary, gross or inexcusable neglect, would prevent
equitable relief under the circumstances of this case." 118 A. at 49.
In Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. Co., Inc., supra, the only reason given for the
lessees' failure to give timely notice was that it was an "oversight," and a "mistake and
not intentional." 935 P.2d at 1000. The Hawaii court stated that such actions were not
"intentional, willful, or even grossly negligence." Id.
In Car-X Service Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller, supra, the Tenth Circuit was
not concerned with the reason as to why the notice had not timely been given at all.
Rather, predicting (correctly) that Kansas courts would grant equitable relief pursuant to
the standards set down in F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, and its progeny, that court
concluded that it was sufficient that this was "not an instance of an intentioned or willful
failure to timely renew." Id. 927 F.2d at 516. And, indeed, when confronted with the
precise issue in Fleming Companies, Inc. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, supra, the
Kansas Court of Appeals agreed, granting equitable relief notwithstanding the fact that
the tenant was a sophisticated corporation, with a highly structured system for monitoring
its leases, which had suffered an internal miscommunication when the employee who had
been in charge of the matter left, after meeting with his immediate supervisor, and
providing him with a folder containing leases (including the subject one) that required
"immediate attention." 818 P. 2d at 814-15. Again, that court found that there was "no
evidence in the record to suggest that Fleming's actions were intentional, willful, or even
inexcusably negligence," and stated that the characterization of its conduct "as negligence
or mistaken is basically irrelevant," and that "as long as its conduct was not intentional,
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willful, or grossly negligent," it should prevail. The court further said, in words equally
applicable here, that "Equitable [the Landlord] might attempt to argue that a failure to
renew a lease of such value to the company would amount to gross negligence, but this is
not supported by the facts of record." 818 P.2d at 820.
In Trollen v. City of Wabasha, supra, the tenant apparently simply never
bothered to check his lease, and was, therefore, "unaware of the timing" with respect to
the exercise of the option to renew. 287 N.W.2d at 647. Finding that there was no
evidence the tenant "was willfully or grossly negligent," and that his "reasonable reliance
on the past course of dealings between himself and the city led him to neglect
ascertaining his formal obligations under the lease," the Minnesota court held that
equitable relief should have been granted. Id. at 648.
In Fletcher v. Frisbee, supra, the tenant utilized an attorney to exercise the
option, but the attorney apparently failed to discover the deadline for exercise of the
option in the lease, and, therefore, sent notice late. 404 A.2d at 1108. The New
Hampshire court not only excused this negligence, but excused the failure to send the
notice by registered mail, notwithstanding a specific lease requirement. Id. at 1109.
In Sosanie v. Pernetti Holding Corp., supra, the only basis given for the
tenants' failure to give timely notice was "that they had forgotten the date of the
deadline." 279 A.2d at 908. The New Jersey court granted equitable relief, stating that it
was "clear that defendant did not change its position in reliance on plaintiffs' delay," and
plaintiffs were not, therefore, "in laches." Id.
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In J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., supra, there had been a
lease assignment, and a closing at which a Modification Agreement making specific
reference to the lease paragraph containing the provisions for renewal had been executed.
366 N.E.2d at 1315. Although it is difficult to imagine anything that would have more
clearly brought to the attention of the assignees the existence of the renewal provision,
the assignees apparently never bothered to obtain a copy of the lease or of the specific
paragraph referred to, and had simply assumed that they had an absolute right to retain
the tenancy. Id. The New York court noted that it had "cautioned that equitable relief
would be denied where there has been a willful or gross neglect . . . but, has been
reluctant to employ the sanction when a forfeiture would result." 366 N.E.2d at 1317.
Here, the "tenant was at fault, but not in a culpable sense," and equitable relief should
have been granted. Id.
Similarly, in Ward v. Washington Distributors, Inc., supra, the tenant, like
U.S. Realty here, utilized a lease abstract system, and failed to timely renew due to an
inaccuracy in that system. 429 N.E.2d at 422. The Ohio court characterized the delay in
renewing the lease as having been "caused by an honest, good-faith mistake, to wit, the
misreading of the lease" and the misfiling of the landlord's prior letter alerting the tenant
to the correct commencement date, and found equitable relief appropriate, since "there
was no willful or deliberate act or omission of the lessees." Id. at 423.
Finally, in Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kaiser, supra, there was an
assignment of the applicable lease to a partnership. Although one of the partners was a
licensed real estate broker, and although the partnership was represented by an attorney in
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connection with the assignment, neither the partners, nor the attorney, bothered to obtain
a copy of the lease or read the lease prior to the assignment. 723 S.W.2d at 300. The
tenant only became aware of any renewal requirement at all when the landlord advised
that it had not been timely exercised. Id. Interestingly, the landlord made an argument
strikingly similar to the argument that was accepted by the trial court in this case,
pointing to the tenant's failure even to obtain a copy of the lease, and, in particular,
arguing "Schulgen, as a real estate agent, knew or should have known to inquire and
obtain copies of the relevant instruments." Id. at 301. The Texas court stated that
although the plaintiff was negligent, to "overlook something does not call for punitive
treatment," and that since plaintiffs "conduct does not reflect conscious indifference of
his right, nor can we say that it represents the attitude of a person who knew of his peril
but demonstrated by his conduct that he did not care," equitable relief was appropriate.
Id.
There is simply no way that the conduct of U.S. Realty could be deemed so
radically different in degree or kind from the conduct of the tenants in the above cases as
to warrant the punitive result here. U.S. Realty set up a system for the management of its
properties and for its Leases, and had always found that system to be accurate. In this
one case, unfortunately, the system failed, and as a result, the notice was sent late. There
was no intentional failure to renew, as in Gardner; no casual indifference such as
apparently existed in F.B. Fountain Co., Aickin, Car-X Service, Trollen or Sosanie, and
certainly no failure to even bother to obtain a copy of the relevant Lease or Lease
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provisions, as in J.N.A. Realty or Inn of the Hills. The extreme result here cannot, then,
be justified under any of the relevant case law.
The use of the "sliding scale" approach with a heightened standard of care
by the trial court so as to deny U.S. Realty the relief to which it plainly would have been
entitled in virtually every jurisdiction recognizing the availability of such relief was clear
error. The determination of the trial court should, therefore, be reversed.
4.

Marshalling of the evidence. Being mindful of the requirement of

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P., that a party challenging a finding of fact2 must first
marshal the evidence, U. S. realty recites the following:
(a)

Mark Hoffman is a lawyer who, prior to his employment by

Garden Homes, was employed by a private law firm for three years. Mr. Hoffman
graduated from Seton Hall Law School in 1990. While in private practice, Mr. Hoffman
engaged in a general real estate practice, which included drafting contracts for the sale of
real estate. Mr. Hoffman had no previous legal experience with leases. [R. 616 pp. 16,
103, 104]
(b)

At the time Mr. Hoffman became the asset manager of the K-

Mart Center and the other centers that were acquired by U. S. Realty in 1995, he did not
read the Ground Leases in their entirety. Instead, he relied upon Phil Shiftman to advise
him as to any deadlines requiring action on the part of U. S. Realty. [R. 616 p. 45]

* As stated above, U. S. Realty contends that its challenges to the trial court's ruling involves mixed
questions of law and fact or conclusions of law. However, the evidence is marshaled in the event the
findings of fact are implicated in this appeal.
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(c)

In November 1996, Mr. Hoffman received a letter from Mr.

Joel Nelson of UDOT referencing the expiration of the Ground Leases in July, 1998. Mr.
Hoffman was not concerned at this time about the option renewal requirements because
his previous experience indicated that U. S. Realty's system of relying upon lease
abstracts was working well and that he would be advised by Phil Shiffman as to any
approaching deadlines for taking action. [R. 616 pp. 51, 122, 123, Exhs. 12(A) and (B)]
(d)

Mr. Hoffman read the option renewal provisions of the

Ground Leases for the first time on April 17, 1998. Prior to this date, Mr. Hoffman was
unaware that written notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise its option was required.
The option notice requirements were not contained in the Lease Abstracts received from
Winding Brook and entered into U. S. Realty's computer database by Phil Shiffman. [R.
616 pp. 51, 122, 123]
(e)

Phil Shiffman did not separately and specifically read or

abstract the Ground Leases at the time these documents were obtained from Winding
Brook because he relied entirely on the Lease Abstracts to provide all relevant
information about those Leases. [R. 616 p. 169]
(f)

Mr. Hoffman had access to the Ground Leases and had

consulted them for other purposes, but he did not specifically undertake to determine the
length of the original terms or any option provisions until April 17, 1998. [R. 616 p. 113]
(g)

Mr. Hoffman did not deem it necessary to specifically

compare the Abstracts with the Ground Leases because he had confidence in the prior
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management company and the abstracts they had prepared, since Mr. Burstyn was a
partner in U. S. Realty. [R. 616 pp. 120, 121]
(h)

The Defendants did not take any action which caused U. S.

Realty to delay giving the notice of intention to exercise its options. [R. 616 p. 144]
(i)

Phil Shiftman did not specifically prepare a separate lease

abstract for the Ground Leases because his experience was limited to tracking the
obligations of landlords under leases, not tenants, and Mr. Shiftman had never previously
managed a tenant's responsibility under a Ground Lease. [R. 616 pp. 111-112, 169]
(j)

The Lease Abstracts do not advise as to how or when the

Ground Lease options are to be exercised. [Exhs. 11(A)-(D)]
(k)

U. S. Realty's tenants at the K-Mart Center were required to

give written notice of their intention to renew options under the Leases. [R. 616 pp. 110,
111, 173, 174, Exhs. 26-29]
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that Defendants had not

Impliedly Waived their Right to Receive Notice, Even if this Court were to find that
U.S. Realty is not entitled to equitable relief, the Defendants have clearly waived any
right to insist on strict enforcement of the option renewal notice provisions. A landlord's
contractual right to receive notice of a tenant's intent to renew a Lease may be waived if
the landlord has knowledge of its right to notice and has expressed or implied an
intention to relinquish the right. See, e.g., Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 71-72 (Utah
1998). The required intent to relinquish a contractual right may be implied from action or
inaction by the waiving party. See K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 629 (Utah
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1994). Although the intent to relinquish the right must be distinct, the trial court must
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if the inference of relinquishment
is justified. See, e.g, Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 73, n. 6, and Soter's v. Deseret Federal Sav.
and Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah 1993). "There may be instances in which a
number of ambiguous events, statements or examples of conduct may show, in the
totality of circumstances, a distinct intent." Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at n.6.
To evaluate waiver implied from conduct, the Court's primary focus must be the
effect of such conduct on the party claiming waiver, not any unspoken or private mental
reservation by the waiving party. See, e.g., B.R. Woodward Mrktg. v. Collins Food, 754
P.2d 99, 103 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Such conduct must clearly evince an intent to waive
or at least be inconsistent with any other intent. Id "Failure to adhere to the precise
terms of the contract, combined with the absence of notice of a party's intention to insist
on strict compliance, is enough evidence to support a finding of waiver." Beckstead v.
Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Beckstead is particularly helpful in examining how the Utah appellate courts have
applied the doctrine of implied waiver with respect to contractual notice provisions. In
Beckstead, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant roofing company for
the repair of plaintiff s roof. The contract required that plaintiff provide written notice to
the roofing company within 30 days of the discovery of any leaks. Plaintiff admittedly
failed to comply with this notice requirement, and the roofing company subsequently
asserted that the plaintiffs failure precluded any claim for additional repairs. 831 P. 2d at
132-133.

The plaintiff had given oral notice to which the roofing company had
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previously responded. Under these facts, the trial court found that the roofing company
had waived its right to receive written notice. This finding was affirmed by the Utah
Court of Appeals, citing the "totality of the circumstances." Id.
In this case, U. S. Realty argued that implied waiver was established under the
totality of the circumstances.

The following facts, which are essentially undisputed,

establish the primary support for this claim: (1) both before and after the deadline for
giving the required notice, the Defendants continued to negotiate, and eventually reached
an agreement, with U. S. Realty for reduction in ground rents during the option periods in
exchange for U. S. Realty's waiver of any rights to the proceeds of the condemnation
actions; and (2) Defendant, Security Investment, requested that U. S. Realty pay sewer
assessments up through December 31, 1998, which is five months into the option period.
U. S. Realty also made a slope easement payment to Defendants extending into the option
period.
The trial court concluded that the above factors, taken together, did not constitute
a clear did unambiguous waiver by implication. The court primarily based this decision
on the its finding that Defendants were unaware of their rights to timely notice until on or
about July 15, 1998. [Memorandum Decision, p. 13] U. S. Realty contends the court
erred as a matter of law in its application of the implied waiver analysis.
1.

Constructive knowledge of a contractual right is sufficient for

purposes of implied waiver. Although no Utah case appears to deal specifically with
the issue, U. S. Realty contends that constructive knowledge is sufficient, under the
totality of the circumstances, to support the "knowledge" element of implied waiver. It
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makes no sense to encourage parties to remain ignorant of contractual rights and
obligations by rigidly applying an "actual" knowledge standard for purposes of implied
waiver.
Substantial authority exists from other jurisdictions to establish this
principle. In R. Conrad Moore and Assoc, Inc., v. Lerma, 946 S.W. 2d 90 (Tex. App.
1997), the Texas Court of Appeals addressed a claim by a seller of real property that the
prospective buyers had impliedly waived their contractual right to the refund of their
earnest money by the buyers' conduct subsequent to the events creating the right to the
refund.

The real estate contract at issue provided that if the buyers' loan was not

approved within 60 days, the contract would terminate and the earnest: money would be
refunded to the buyer without delay. 946 S.W. 2d at 92. However, after the loan was not
approved within 60 days, the buyers continued their efforts to purchase the home,
including the approval of construction plans and requests for additions and alterations to
the home. Id. at 93, 94.
The buyers subsequently demanded a refund of their earnest money, which
was rejected by the seller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the buyers,
finding that the seller had breached the contract by failing to promptly return the earnest
money. IdL
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, finding as a matter of
law that the buyers impliedly waived their right to have the earnest money refunded by
their conduct. The Court rejected the buyers' arguments that they were unaware of the
refund right on the date the right arose and therefore could not relinquish a "known"
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right. Id. After citing the rule that constructive knowledge of a contractual right is
sufficient, the Court held that "[Although the [buyers] claim that they were unaware that
they could get their money back on [the date the right arose], both [buyers] signed the
contract . . .

A person who signs a contract is presumed to know and understand its

contents; absent a finding of fraud, failure to comprehend the rights and obligations under
the contract will not excuse performance." Id. at 94. See also Garff Realty Co. v. Better
Buildings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234, P.2d 842, 844 (Utah 1951) (party chargeable with
knowledge of contractual terms); 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 158 (waiver
requires actual or constructive knowledge of right).
Many other jurisdictions and respected treatises also recognize that
constructive knowledge of a right is sufficient for purposes of implied waiver:
The party who has allegedly waived his or her contract rights is
presumed to know those things (including matters concerning
the other party's performance or failure to perform) which
reasonable diligence on his or her part would bring to his or her
attention. Thus, the party charged with waiver may not plead
willful ignorance and escape the waiver; rather, a waiver made
with knowledge of the facts that would put an ordinary person
on inquiry is sufficient. Consistent with this rule, because a
person who signs a contract is presumed to know and understand
its contents, the failure to read a contract, or to apprehend the
rights and obligations under it, will not prevent a waiver of its
terms and conditions.
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, Vol. 13., p. 595-96 (4th ed., 2000), See
also, e.g., Ridgway v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Kan. App. 1996)
(knowledge of a contractual right for purposes of implied waiver may be actual or
constructive, and it is the duty of every contracting party to learn and know the contents
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of its contract); In re Sangren, 504 N.W. 2d 786, 790 (Minn. App. 1993) (for purposes of
waiver, the knowledge of the contractual right alleged to have been waived may be actual
or constructive); Pipe Indust. Ins. v. Consolidated Pipe Trades Trust of Montana, 760
P.2d 711, 717 (Mont. 1998) (approving a jury instruction on waiver which included the
following language: "A person may waive a right, claim or privilege only if he has
knowledge of the facts which are material or important to his decision. This knowledge
may be either actual or constructive. Constructive knowledge is knowledge which one
has an opportunity to acquire by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, whether or
not such knowledge is, in fact, acquired."); and Taylor v. Kenco Chemical and Mfg.
Corp., 465 So.2d 581, 587 (Fla. App. 1985) (the knowledge requirement for purposes of
waiver may be actual or constructive).
In light of the above, the trial court committed clear legal error in requiring
actual knowledge of Defendants' contractual rights to receive notice as a necessary
element of implied waiver. Such right was established in the Leases, and Defendants are
charged with constructive knowledge of those terms.
2.

The trial court erred in its application of the implied waiver

standard to essentially undisputed facts. Applying the appropriate standard to the
evidence produced at trial compels the conclusion that Defendants' conduct, through
action and inaction, constitutes implied waiver of the right to receive 150 day prior
written notice of U. S. Realty's intent to exercise its options. Similar to the roofing
contractor in Beckstead, discussed above, Defendants did not insist upon strict
compliance with the written notice provision until July 15, 1998, only two weeks prior to
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the expiration of the original term and three months after U. S. Realty's written notice
exercising the option was provided. In the interim, all parties continued to negotiate
resolution of the condemnation actions, the terms of which would provide economic
benefits to U. S. Realty only during the future option periods. If the leases were to
terminate on July 31, 1998, for failure of timely notice to renew, there would have been
no need to negotiate this resolution after the option renewal date passed on March 3,
1998. Yet, it is undisputed - and the trial court found — that these negotiations continued
until an agreement was reached providing Defendants with the entire condemnation
proceeds, and U.S. Realty a reduction in rent during the option periods. Defendants even
requested Mark Hoffman to prepare a written agreement memorializing this agreement
only a few days before Defendants purported to terminate the Leases. All of these
actions are inconsistent with anything other than an intent to waive the notice provision.
Finally, on July 8, 1998, Defendants sent Mark Hoffman a letter demanding
payment of option period sewer expenses. These actions are also inconsistent with any
intent other than the waiver of the notice provision. If the Leases were terminating, U. S.
Realty would have no obligation to make these payments. Incredibly, Defendants were
instead allowed by the trial court to use their willful ignorance of the Ground Lease terms
as the basis to preclude waiver while depriving U.S. Realty of its rights on the same
asserted basis. This result cannot be appropriate.
Tellingly, the notices sent by U. S. Realty were actually ignored by both
Defendants, indicating that they attached no significance whatsoever to the right to
receive notice or when it is received. Accordingly, the totality of these circumstances
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clearly evinces an intent to waive the notice requirement or is at least inconsistent with
any other intent, and the elements of implied waiver are established. The trial court's
ruling to the contrary must be rejected.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly erred in concluding that U. S. Realty was not entitled to
equitable relief excusing its failure to deliver timely notice of its intention to exercise its
options to renew the Ground Leases. The Court not only made legal errors in applying an
improper legal standard, the Court also erred in concluding that U. S. Realty's agents
were grossly negligent in failing to provide timely notice based on the undisputed facts of
this case. Under the appropriate legal standard, the evidence demonstrates that the failure
to provide a timely notice was not due to any willful misconduct or utter lack of care by
U. S. Realty's agents but, rather, was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake or, at
worst, mere negligence. The delay in giving notice under these long-term Leases was
very slight, there is no resulting prejudice to the Defendants, and to deny U. S. Realty the
equitable relief it seeks would result in the forfeiture of its leasehold interest worth more
than $1,300,000.
The trial court also erred in concluding that the Defendants had not impliedly
waived their right to receive notice of U. S. Realty's intention to exercise its options. The
trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in failing to recognizetibiatimplied waiver
can be based upon constructive knowledge of a contractual right.

The undisputed

evidence, as well as the findings of the Court, demonstrate that Defendants' conduct after
they received the untimely notices strongly evinces an intention to waive the right to
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receive notice and is inconsistent with any other intent.

Specifically, the parties

continued to negotiate and reached an agreement resolving the pending condemnation
actions, which could be implemented only if U. S. Realty exercised its options since the
agreement only provided U. S. Realty with a reduction in future rents.
As a result of the foregoing, U. S. Realty respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the trial court's Judgment and enter an Order granting U. S. Realty the equitable
relief it seeks in the form of a declaratory judgment excusing its failure to provide timely
notice, and declaring that Defendants have impliedly waived any right to receive such
notice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c ? ^ ^ v day of September, 2000.
YOUNG, ADAMS & HOFFMAN, LLP
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George K. Fadel, Esq.
Attorney for Appellees/Defendants
170 West 400 South
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS
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Ground Lease (Olson) dated August 17, 1972

P-2

Ground Lease (Security Investment) dated August 17, 1972

P-l 1

Abstracts of Leases

P-l3

Notices of Exercise of Ground Lease Option dated April 17, 1998

P-l5

Security Investment Letter to Pay Sewer Service dated July 8, 1998

P-l8

Olson Letter Terminating Lease dated July 15, 1998

P-l9

Security Investment Letter Returning Check dated July 21, 1998

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, FARMTNGTON DEPARTMENT
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES,
a New Jersey general partnership,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
v.
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, WILLIAM K. OLSON,
an individual, and BARBARA L. OLSON,
an individual,

Case No. 980700324

Defendants.

This matter was tried to the Court on February 23 & 24, 2000. Following the trial the
Court asked the parties to submit post-trial briefs on three legal issues, which the Court will
discuss below. The parties submitted their post-trial briefs, and oral argument was had before the
Court on March 28, 2000. The matter is now ripe for decision. The Court has considered the
facts, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law. Being fully informed, the Court makes
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Courtfindsthat the following undisputed material facts support its conclusions of
law:
1.

The defendants are the owners of the property that is the subject of the leases at issue in this

case.1
2.

The defendants entered into leases in 1972 with plaintiffs predecessors in interest. Pursuant

to those leases defendants leased the undeveloped real property to plaintiffs predecessors in
interest. The leases were for a term of 25 years with additional five year options for extension of
the leases. The 25 year term was to begin on August 1, 1973.
3.

After the lease term began, plaintiffs predecessors in interest mortgaged the property in

order to build the Woods Cross K-Mart Center (the "K-Mart Center"). Defendants subordinated
their interests in the real property to the mortgages to facilitate the development of the property.
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest have paid the mortgage payments since that time.
However, the parties agree that if plaintiff is unable to exercise the option at issue here,
defendants will take over the mortgage paymentsfromthe time the lease terminated until they are
paid in full.
4.

Plaintiff obtained the leasehold estates from its predecessors in interest on October 15, 1986.

Plaintiff paid rent to the defendants from that date until the end of the 25 year lease term, on July
31, 1998.

1

Part of the land in question is owned by Security Investment, LTD., and part of the land is
owned by defendants Olson. One of the leases is between plaintiff and Security Investment,
LTD., and the other is between plaintiff and defendants Olson. For the purposes of the Court's
analysis, the terms of the leases are identical in all respects.
2

5.

Under the lease agreements between plaintiff and defendants, there was an initial option to

extend the lease term for five years after the expiration of the initial lease term. If that initial
option was exercised, plaintiff was entitled to five successive options to extend the lease term,
each for a term of five years. The options were to be exercised by plaintiff as follows: "All
options herein granted shall be exercised by notice in writing to Landlord given not later than 150
days prior to the expiration of the then-existing lease term . . . ." Thus, plaintiff should have given
written notice to defendants of their intent to exercise the option no later than March 3, 1998.
6.

In October of 1995, direct management of the K-Mart Center was transferred from Winding

Brook Co. to Garden Homes Group. Garden Homes Group employed an attorney, Mark
Hoffman, as the company's asset manager. An accountant for Garden Homes Group, Phil
Schiffman, worked closely with Mark Hoffman in managing the company's assets.
7.

Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman obtained the files and records for the K-Mart Center from

Winding Brook Co. after the transfer. These included the leases in question here, as well as an
abstract of pertinent data from the leases that was compiled by Winding Brook Co.. The abstract
was used by Hoffman and Schiffrnan in their day-to-day management of the K-Mart Center (and
other properties). Hoffman relied upon Schiffman to provide him with notice of dates requiring
affirmative actions on the part of plaintiff under the leases. Schiffman derived a tickler system
from the abstract to alert Hoffman and Schiffman of important dates and deadlines. Hoffman and
Schiffman relied on the information in the abstract without comparing it to actual lease terms to
verify its accuracy. They presumed that the abstract was accurate because it was prepared by one
of the partner's in plaintiffs company.

3

8.

In 1996 the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") notified the parties of its

intention to condemn a part of the property in question for construction of an access road to
Interstate 15. At that time Mark Hoffman reviewed part of the leases, to determine what
plaintiffs rights were upon condemnation.
9.

On or about November 1, 1996 a letter was sent to Mark Hoffman by Joel R. Nelson. The

letter was concerning K-Mart's need for a reduction in rent because of the amount of property to
be condemned by UDOT. However, the letter contained a paragraph that put Mark Hoffman on
notice of the need to look into the terms for the exercise of the option. The letter states: "The
current lease expires August 1, 1998. If the option to renew the lease is exercised the new rent I
understand will be $20,400/month
10.

"

UDOTfiledthe condemnation action against the property in March of 1997. There was a

dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants as to whether or not plaintiff should receive part
of the condemnation proceeds. The parties discussed the possibility of reducing plaintiff's rent
during the option periods if plaintiff would agree to disclaim any interest in the condemnation
proceeds.
11.

On or about April 17, 1998 Mark Hoffman reviewed the terms of the leases to ascertain

how the rents should be reduced during the option periods. At that time Mark Hoffman
discovered that the terms of the leases required plaintiff to give 150 days written notice prior to
the end of the lease to exercise the option to renew the leases. This caused Mark Hoffman and
Phil Schiffman to check the tickler system and the abstract, to see if the option deadline was in
those documents. The option deadline was not mentioned in either document. Plaintiff alleges,
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and there is no evidence to the contrary, that this is the only material error found to date in the
tickler system and abstract.
12.

On April 17, 1998 Mark Hoffiman sent notices to defendants of plaintiff s intent to exercise

its options. The notices were received by the defendants on April 22, 1998. Thus, the notice
provided by plaintiff was at least 50 days late, as the leases required that the notice be sent no
later than 150 days prior to the end of the lease term. As mentioned above, March 3, 1998 was
150 days prior to the end of the lease terms.
13.

Between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 plaintiff and defendants were in agreement as to

how they should settle their dispute over the proceedsfromthe condemnation action. They
agreed that plaintiff would give up any right to the proceeds, and in return defendants would
reduce the rents during the future option periods.
14.

At some time between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 defendants requested and plaintiff

paid for sewer assessments and a slope easement, which brought the property current on these
items through December 31, 1998, which is approximately five months into the first option
period.
15.

Between April 22, 1998 and July 15, 1998 the defendants did not take any action to assume

liabilities, obligations or responsibilities in relation to the property.
16.

On July 15, 1998 defendants Olson sent a letter to plaintiff, informing plaintiff that its

notice to exercise the option was not effective because it was not timely, and indicating that the
only way for the relationship to continue between the parties was to renegotiate the rental value
of the property.
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17.

On July 17, 1998 defendant Security Investment LTD. sent a letter to plaintiff, informing

plaintiff that its notice to exercise the option was not effective because it was not timely, and
setting forth terms under which plaintiff could continue to lease the property if it so desired.
18.

On or about December 16, 1998 defendants' attorney served a Notice to Quit upon

plaintiff, informing them that they were in unlawful detainer of the property, because the options
had not been validly exercised.
19.

On or about March 4, 1999 plaintiffs filed a formal disclaimer of any right to the

condemnation proceeds. The disclaimer states that plaintiffs agreement to forego any right to the
condemnation proceeds was based on defendants' agreement to reduce the rent during the option
periods.
20.

Plaintiff continues to manage the property and collect rents from the subtenants. Pursuant

to Court order, plaintiff pays the expenses of managing the property out of the rents paid by the
subtenants, and submits any net profit to the clerk of the court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
There are three legal issues before the Court. The first issue is whether Utah law gives
trial courts power to grant equitable relief to a lessee who has failed to timely exercise an option
to extend its lease. The second issue presumes that Utah law provides for such equitable relief,
and is an inquiry into whether or not the plaintiff has satisfied all of the requirements to avail itself
of that equitable relief. The third and final issue is whether the conduct of the defendants in this
case amounts to a waiver of their right to receive timely written notice of plaintiff s intent to
exercise the options.

6

Before proceeding with its analysis of the three legal issues set forth above, the Court
notes that Utah law requires strict compliance with the option terms of a lease. Geisdorfv,
Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to
strictly comply with the option terms of the two leases at issue here. Thus, plaintiff can only
obtain relief from its failure to strictly comply with the option terms if there is an equitable remedy
available. If there is an equitable remedy available, then plaintiff must have satisfied all of the
requirements to avail itself of the equitable remedy.
The Court concludes that Utah law does provide an equitable remedy for a lessee who has
failed to strictly comply with the option terms of a lease. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly
recognized "that there are instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably
excused." Geisdorf at 71. Counsel for defendants correctly states in his post-trial brief that the
Supreme Court did not need to rely on its discussion of equitable relief to deny the plaintiff there
relief, as he did not request equitable relief. However, the Court does not believe that the
Supreme Court's discussion of equitable relief in Geisdorf can be dismissed offhand as mere
obiter dictum. The Supreme Court's discussion of equitable relief was made to explain or even
justify the application of the strict compliance rule. The Supreme Court recognizes, as have the
appellate courts of many other states, that in some cases the strict application of a rule of law
would be inequitable, and that in those cases courts can use their equitable powers to render
appropriate relief. The statements made by the Supreme Court in Geisdorf were made to give
trial courts direction on how and when equitable relief should be granted.
Having concluded that equitable relief is available under Utah law, the Court must
determine the standard for granting equitable relief. Then the Court must go on to determine
7

whether the facts before the Court are such that plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief. First, a
lessee "may be excused from strict compliance . . . when the [lessee's] 'conduct in failing to
comply was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the [lessee] but was rather the
result of an honest and justifiable mistake.'" Geisdorf at 71 (quoting Cattle Feeders, Inc. v.
Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. App. 1977)). While the Utah Supreme Court did not further
develop the equitable relief standard, other courts have determined that if a lessee has failed to
strictly comply with the option terms of a lease because of mere negligence, the court should not
automatically grant equitable relief. Rather, the court must further analyze the facts of the case
and grant relief only where: 1) the delay in providing written notice has been slight; 2) the loss to
the lessor is small; and 3) to refuse equitable relief would result in unconscionable hardship to the
lessee. F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 50 (Conn. 1922). Finally, Geisdorf further
provides that trial courts can provide equitable relief'"where the strict compliance was prevented
by some act of the [lessor] such as waiver or misleading representations or conduct.'" Geisdorf at
71 (quoting Cattle Feeder's, Inc. at 33).
The first factual determination the Court must make is whether plaintiffs failure to strictly
comply with the option terms of the lease was due to willful or gross negligence, or whether it
was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake. At the outset the Court notes that the facts of
this case make it difficult to simply state that plaintiff was willfully or grossly negligent, or that
plaintiff was merely negligent. There are no discrete jcaiegories of behavior into whkh-^intiff s
behavior clearly fits^ Rather, there is a continuum between mere negligence and willful or gross
negligence, and the Court must determine whether plaintiffs conduct is closer to willful or gross
negligence on that continuum, or whether it is closer to mere negligence.
8

It is axiomatic that negligence is the failure to exercise the standard of care that a
reasonably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances Cooper v Evans 262 P 2d
278, 280 (Utah 1953) Though not specifically defined as such by Utah case law, willful
negligence has been defined elsewhere as being "voluntary " F B Fountain Co at 49 2 Finally,
Utah law defines gross negligence as follows "'Gross negligence is the failure to observe even
slight care, it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the
consequences that may result" Atkin Wright & Miles v Mountain States Tel & Tel Co , 709
P 2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985)(quoting Robinson Ins And Real Estate, Inc v Southwestern Bell Tel
Co_,366FSupp 307,311 (WD Ark 1973)) The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
referred to willful and gross negligence together by using the term "culpable negligence " F B
Fountain Co at 49
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that the negligence of plaintiffs
employees, Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman, was closer to willful or gross negligence than it
was to mere negligence Both of these individuals are professionals Mark Hoffman is an
attorney, and Phil Schiffman is an accountant They make a living by managing commercial
properties for the plaintiff As professionals, they are held to a higher standard than nonprofessionals. Thus, while it was convenient for them to rely on the abstract provided to them by
Winding Brook Company to give them all pertinent information concerning the leases in question,
it was grossly negligent for them to fail to read the leases to discover how to exercise the options
Both Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiffman were aware of the fact that the 25 year leases would

2

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the term "willful" "implies something in addition to
mere negligence " Salas v Industrial Common of Utah, 564 P 2d 1119, 1120 (Utah 1977)
9

expire on July 31, 1998. They knew this long before March 3, 1998. Both Hoffman and
Schiffinan knew that there were five-year options available under the leases. They discussed the
options with the defendants. They negotiated rents for the option periods pursuant to the
condemnation proceeding. Furthermore, both Hoffman and Schiffman knew or should have
known that the abstract did not tell them how to exercise their options under the leases. They
both knew that options had to be exercised according to certain terms, because their subtenants
exercised options with them. Despite the knowledge Hoffman and Schiffman had of the need to
find out how to properly exercise the options, neither of them took the time to read the leases to
obtain this information. Their failure to read the lease until 45 days after the option deadline had
passed was the primary, if not sole, cause of their failure to provide timely written notice to the
defendants. The Court cannot in good conscience conclude that the failure of two professionals
to read their leases is mere negligence. Rather, the Court concludes that their failure to read the
leases was failure to exercise even slight care. It was carelessness that shows utter indifference to
the consequences that resulted. Plaintiffs employees were grossly negligent, and equity will not
intervene to rescue them from their culpable negligence.
The final issue the Court must address is whether the conduct of the defendants amounts
to a waiver of their right to notice according to the express terms of the lease. The Utah Supreme
Court in Geisdorf clarified the standard for waiver in these cases. "A waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right... a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Geisdorf at 72. Furthermore, trial
courts are to "assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is
clearly intended. Any waiver must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." Id.
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Finally, where the alleged waiver is merely to be implied, trial courts are "to be especially careful
in their examination of the evidence. Id.
Turning to the facts of this case, the Court first notes that there is no allegation that any of
the defendants expressly waived their rights to notice under the terms of the leases. Thus, the
Court must carefully assess the totality of the circumstances to see whether the defendants clearly
intended to relinquish theirrightsto notice.
Plaintiff argues that three facts indicate that the defendants waived their right to timely
notice. First, the defendants did not object to plaintiffs tardy notice until at least July 15, 1998.
Apparently it is plaintiffs position that defendant's silence on the issue between April 22, 1998
and July 15, 1998 amounts to a waiver of the defendants' right to timely notice. Second, the
defendants negotiated with plaintiff for a reduction in rents during the option periods. The
implication plaintiff seeks to derive from this is that defendants had implicitly accepted plaintiffs
tardy notice, and had determined to allow them to exercise the options despite the late notice.
Finally, on July 8, 1998, defendant Security Investment LTD. asked plaintiff to pay sewer
assessments up through December 31, 1998, which isfivemonths into the option period.
Plaintiffs contend that defendant Security Investment LTD. would not have made this request if it
had intended to enforce the option terms of the lease. Plaintiff argues that these facts, taken
together, demonstrate that defendants intended to waive their right to timely notice, or is at least
inconsistent with any other intent.
In analyzing the facts of this case, the Court notes that "[m]ere silence is not a waiver
unless there is some duty or obligation to speak." Geisdorf at 72. The parties here were dealing
with one-another at arms-length, and defendants did not have a duty or obligation to speak to
11

plaintiff immediately upon receipt of the tardy notice. Thus, the fact that defendants were silent
for almost three months after plaintiff filed its tardy notice cannot be used to demonstrate an
implied waiver.
The Court notes that it is difficult to decide whether or not the negotiation of the parties
as to the reduction of rents during the option periods demonstrates that defendants clearly
intended to waive their right to timely notice. The Court concludes that this fact does not provide
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendants clearly intended to waive their right
to timely notice. When the parties were negotiating the future rent reductions, they were not
discussing the issue of whether or not plaintiff should have to provide timely notice. Rather, they
were negotiating a settlement of a long-time dispute between the parties concerning the proceeds
of a condemnation proceeding. Thus, their discussions cannot be seen as an implied waiver of
their rights to timely notice. Furthermore, the Court notes that the negotiations between the
parties is not whatjaused plaintifftQ-fail taprovide timely^notice. Rather, the sole cause of
plaintiffs failure to provide timelv notice was the failure of Mark Hoffman and Phil Schiflman to
read the leases. If the parties' negotiations had caused plaintiff to be luiiedintojalse security, and
thus caused plaintiff to fail to orovide timelv notice, the equities would weigh more heavily in
favor of plaintiff.
Next, the Court concludes that defendant Security Investment, LTD.'s request that
plaintiff pay the sewer assessments through December 31, 1998 is not sufficient to demonstrate a
clear intent to waive the right to timely notice. It could be seen as a tacit admission that plaintiff
would still have rights under the leases beyond the original July 31, 1998 termination date.
However, the Court notes that there is no evidence that the person asking plaintiff tojpay the
12

sewer assessment was thinking about the exercise of the options when they made this request.
Under the terms of the leases plaintiff was required to pay all assessments, taxes etc. Thus, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that defendant Security Investment, LTD. became aware of an
assessment that was due, and simply asked plaintiff to pay it.
When the Court considers all of the facts together, it is not convinced that defendants
clearly and unambiguously intended to waive their rights to timely notice. There is one weakness
shared by all of these facts that leads the Court to conclude that defendants did not make a clear
and unambiguous waiver. There is no evidence that the various defendants knew that they had a
right to timely notice at the time the various defendants acted or failed to act as alleged by
plaintiff. For the Court to find waiver, the defendants must have had: 1) a right to timely notice;
2) knowledge of their right to timely notice; and 3) an intention to relinquish their right to timely
notice. The Court finds that it is reasonable to concludefromthe facts before the Court that the
defendants did not know of the 150 day notice requirement until their attorney made them aware
of it on or about July 15, 1998. And even if the facts do not allow the Court to affirmatively
conclude that the defendants did not know of theirrightto demand timely notice until on or about
July 15, 1998, the Court can affirmatively state that there is no evidence that the defendants had
knowledge of their right to strictly enforce the option provision. Thus, plaintiff cannot obtain
relief under a waiver theory, because plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants had
knowledge of their rights under the option clause.
Pursuant to the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court concludes that
plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable relief sought. Plaintiff is to surrender possession of the
property to defendants immediately. All of the funds placed in Court are to be delivered to the
13

defendants. However, any expenditures plaintiff made prior to August 1, 1998, that provide a
benefit to defendants beyond the termination of the leases, are to be refunded to plaintiff. Counsel
for defendants is directed to prepare a proposed form of order consistent with the Court's ruling
and present it to counsel for plaintiff pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration.

Dated April / /

, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

y£*^z^w
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EXHIBIT 1

GROUVO LMtt £
rjfy4#>'

IlilS L£\SE nude and entered into'as of this / * 7 day of

IU7>U^ by ani between WILLIAM K. OLSON, Landlord, or.d BMiiJARA L." GLSOtf,
Lis wi;:o, oJ 1090 East llillbi\Dok Way, Bountiful, Utah, wife of Landlord.,
and C 5 W Kfl>2H^I7AN ASSOCIATES, a Limted Partnership, of 3H31 V.'^ct Alcona
Street| Houston, Texas (Tenant).
WETKE3SETII THAT:
1, Landlord, for and in consideration of the rents to be paid and
the covenants and agreements to be kept and parformad by Tenant, dees hereby
lease to Tenant the premises situated in Davis County, State of Utah, as ii*
nora particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached.hereto and nv*Je a pari:
hereof and typified on Exhibi.t "B" attached hereto and made a part hcrso.f.
The property covered by such legal description is hereinafter referred vo as
the "demised preridses!^
2* Tenant shall have and hold the demised premises and properly with
the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any v/ise
appertaining thereto, for and during a term of twenty five years c£:nixur:i:ij?
o^UIUai^t
0

. V'

/

ffl3

and tenrixating ™tfj'&f

3/

1 9 ^ , unless

scone^^e^dnfiy^'urider the terms and conditions of this Lease, The phrase.
"lease term1' p ^ s e d i in this Lease shall be the term of this Lease, ar.d any extension thereof pursuant'to'Article 22 hereof,
3, Tenant hereto hirves said demised premises for tlie term herein mentioned and, in consideration of tlie peaceful use and enjoyment of the demised
premises and the performance of all of the terms and provisions thereof to be
perforrcxl by the Landlord, does hereby covenant and agree to pay Landlord> as
rental for said prenu.ses, for the initial twenty five years, the sum of Ten
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (010,500.00)

per*' annum, payable annually

in advance on the first day of each lease year throughout the lease tern be^innin^.
on xhe first day of the month during v;hich Tenant or its Subtenant opens for
business, but in no event later tnan t.;e /f)j

day of (C(.(l. 4 tt^f

197L?,

plus. 38.2 % of onc-thii\l of a#jy over-ride rentals paid to the tenant under the

<k

7

J

provisions of the Krcsge Lease which shall be paid by tenant to . Ir.r'* Vw1. withrlr,
* and 3 8 , # of one third of any override rentals paid by other aubtet .,a or
38 • # of one third of one percent of all sales made by other occupants of
demised premises whichever is greater (applies also to 22. (c)(1) )

GRCU/.O Ul\i

fjti4ty>'

THIS L£\SE made and entered into as of the / * 7 day of
Vf/Ji-^

by ani between WILLIAM K. OLSON, Landlord, and &\U!?.AKA L. GLSOrt,'

Jii^ wi;:e, of 109G East Ilillbrcok Way* Bountiful, Utah, wife of Landjf.rcL,
and C 6 W &VIHW7AN /ASSOCIATES, a Limited Partnership, of 3H31 V.^st AlC-ora
Street, Houston, Texas (Tenant).
WITNESSETH THAT:
1. Landlord, for and in consideration of the rents to be paid and
the covenants and agreements to be kept and performed by Tenant dce.> hereby
lease to Tenant the premises situated in Davis County, State cf Utah, as ii
mora particularly described on Exhibit ,fA" attached hereto and made a part
hereof and typified on Exriibi.t "B" attached hereto and made a part nor so'* •
The property covered by such legal description is hereinafter referred vo <\s
the "demised premises11.
2« Tenant shall have and hold the demised premises and' property with
the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in any wise
appertaining thereto,
and during
during a
a term
term of
of twenty five years ccn^e^in^
appertaining
t h e r e t o , ffor
o r and
oa

4$f
, V°

UMU&f,/

> J a 7 3 and t«nnir.ating

°^UuIu-31

1 8 ? ^ » unless

sooner^emuia^ed 'under the terms and conditions of th
t h i s Lease,

The phrase.

" l e a s e tenn 11 Sfe^tiscd, i n t h i s Lease s h a l l be t h e term of t h i s Lease ard <,ny 'int e n s i o n thereof p u r s u a n t - t o A r t i c l e 22 hereof.
3,

Tenant h e r e t o h i r e s said demised premises f o r t h e texm h e r e i n men-

tioned and, i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e peaceful use and enjoyment of t h e dv-n.iscrd
premises and t h e performance of a l l of t h e terms ard provisions thereof t o be
performed by the Landlord, does hereby covenant and agree t o pay Landlord* a s
r e n t a l f o r said premises, f o r the i n i t i a l twenty f i v e y e a r s , t h e sum of Ten
Thousand Five Ilundixd [ b l l a r s (010,500.00)

per annum, payable annually

i n advance on t h e f i r s t day of each lease year throughout t h e l e a s e t e r n be^.i*u\;'.n,7
on xhe f i r s t cay "of t h e month during which Tenant o r i t s Subtenant opens f o r
b u s i n e s s , b u t i n no event l a t e r tnan t . e / / ) T day of /{jj'4
plus. 38.2

1

7A

l t^l^t

VflSy

% of o n e - t h i r d cf a#jy over-ride r e n t a l s paid t o t h e t e n a n t under t h e

provisions of t h e Krcspe Lease which s h a l l be paid by tenant t o I r r ^ " ' ^ ^ w i t h i n
* and 38.25^ of one t h i r d of any override r e n t a l s paid by other subter ,a or
38.2£ of one t h i r d of one percent of a l l sales made by other occupants of
demised premises whichever i s greater (applies also t o 22. (c)(1) )

Thirty diys following receipt of the over-ride rental by tenant,
H,

(a) Tenant agrees, at its own expense, comiencing on the date

of commencement of the lease term, to pay to the public authorities charged
with the collection "thereof, promptly as the same become due and payable,
all taxes, general and special, assessments and other public charges made
upon or assessed against the demised premises and any building, structures
or improvements now or hereafter located thereon, or arising in respect of
the occupancy, use or possession cf the demised premises u\d which are
assessed and are or

become a lien during the continuance of this Lease*

Further, Tenant agrees to pay all other charges, costs, expenses, liens,
water rents, rates and license fees, including but not limited to water,
electricity, gas, telephone, sewer, other utilities, etc,., to the end that
rents shall be received by Landlord unabated by any such charges*

Tenant

agrees to remit promptly to Landlord, copies of paid receipts with respect
to taxes, and on demand, receipts evidencing payment of all assessments or
other public charges so payable by Tenant, All such taxes ^ for the first and
last year of the term hereof shall be equitably prorated between the parties.
(b)' Tenant shall not be obligated, however, to pay any income
tax, profits tax, excise tax or other tax or charge that may be payable by
or chargeable to Landlord 'Wider any present or future law of the United
States of "the Stat^rin,which the demised premises are located, or imposed
by any political taxing subdivision thereof or -any governmental agency, upon
or with respect to the rent received by Landlorvi under this Lease or upon the
right of Landlord to 'receive such rents or to do business.
(c) Tenant shall not be obligated to pay any inheritance

o?ans-

. fer, estate, succession or other similar tax or charge that may be payable
under any present or future lav; of the United States or the said State or
imposed by any political taxing subdivision thereof or by any other governmental agency, by reason of the devolution, succession, transfer, passing by
inheritance, devise, acquisition or becoming effective of the right to
possession and enjoyment of all or a part of the estate of Landlord

in said

premises, whether by descent, daed, testamentary provision, trust deed, gi ft,
mortgage, or otherwise.

9.

^0.

(d) Tenant shall not be required to pay, discharge or remove
any tax assessment, tax lien, forfeiture, or other imposition or cliarge
upon or against said premises or any part thereof or the improvements at
any time situaied thereon so long as Tenant shall, in good faith, contest
the same or the validity thereof by appropriate legal proceedings which
shall operate to prevent the collection of the tax f assessments, forfeiture,
lien or imposition so contested and to prevent the sale of said premises or
any part thereof to satisfy the same. Pending any such legal proceedings,
landlord shall not have the right to pay, remove or discharge the tax,
assessment, forfeiture, lien or imposition thereby contested, provided
Tenant shall, prior to the date such tax or imposition is due and payable,
have given such reasonable security as may be demanded by Landlord or toake
payment under protest to insure such payments and prevent any sale or forfeiture, or lien, including any penalties and interest charges thereon
imposed by law*
(e) Any proceeding or proceedings for contesting the validity
or amount of taxes, assessments or other public charges or to recover back
any tax, assessment or other imposition paid by Tenant, may be brought by
Tenant in the name of Landlord, or in the name of Tenant, or both, as Tenant
may deem advisable«, but without financial obligation to Landlord,
(f) -If Tenant shall default in the payment of any taxes, assessments or public charges above required to be paid by Tenant, or fail to
maintain the required security for any part thereof being contested, Landlord shall have the right to pay the same together with any penalties and
interest, in which event the amount so paid by Landlord shall be reimbursed
by Tenant, on demand, together with interest thereon at the maximum nonusurious rate r ' l;..':l.:.,....l."'r."ir."l'-r-. ^ —

of

y^K^

.-.: •-^\ from the date

payment by Landlord,

^

^J^

(g) Any taxes paid by Tenant in advance covering a period extending beyond the date of expiration of the final term of this Lease shall be prorated between Tenant and Landlord.
5* This Lease is expressly conditioned upon:

U)

VIul UnilorxJ Idir.rJx

for examination by Tenant, a certified

abstract of title covering the demised premises , certified to a date just priop/?C
to the date of closing of this Lease, or a policy of title insurance with a

jl%

reputable title insurance company, showing that title to the demised premises
is an unencumbered, marketable title, and that such premises are free of any
'liens, encumbrances and easements except such easements as may be necessary
to furnish sewers and public utilities to the demised premises.
"".£>T V.iCi demised premises arc* vacant*
r

, 'Vi .Vr-diorJ. ajivec cha's; Jie V^?;.-c L ;aay, 1'roji tine to time, and.

at any time during t:ie i.erM l.eivof, „:* ics cc^e discretion and at its own
cost and expense, construct: up*.. •. ^.

,

crvy p.:xt of the demised premises,

new buildings and improvements u A on r^e following conditions:
(a) All innprovements and new hri: Jjngs s\r.ll be of a good and
substantial character and such as will lwt tend to decrease the value of the
land hereby demised.
(b) That Tenant shall pay for all labor performed .and materials
furnished in or aluit i <.c 'jLV.crt.ion a:„ construction of ruch buildings and
improvementst av* i crp tna demised p/vjrises and buildings and, improvements
thereon at all tin^s free; and clear :,_ ail liens for labor or materials • furnished in andx>about such erT-ctieri an.; construction, and will defendj at its
own cosr and eirpen^c, c. oh ^r.i ^/ery *ien asserted or claim filed against
said premises and/or the buildings or improvements thereon, or any part
thereof, for labor claimed tcr have been .so performed or material claimed to
• have been so furnished, and promptly pay each and every judgment made or
given against said premises, or any part thereof, or the buildings and/or
improvements thereon, and/or against Landlord or the Tenant, on account of
any such-lien and indemnify aid save harmless the Landlord, their successors
and assigns, from all and every claim and action on account of such claim,
lien or judgment. Tnat no construction shall be commenced without a completion
and performance bond by a corporate surety saving the Landlord and the leased
premises harmless from any and all claims of creditors of any kind and sufficient
to satisfy the Contractor's landing requirement of the State of Utah, A>UI <j~<i>,v.n !<:;.;,
(c) All such construction and the completed buildings shall comply
with all laws and ordinances relating thereto.

J*\
-TTT~"~

(d) No building shall be demolished or substantially reduced
in value during the final five (S) years of the lease term or any renewal
term, except if same is destroyed by fire or other casualty. Nothing in
this paragraph shall abrogate any of the requirements of Article 7 and
Article 10 of this lease.
(e) To finance the construction of such improvements if and
when they may be constructed, the Tenant shall have the right to borrow
money for such purposes for both interim and end financing. The terms
and conditions of such mortgage (s) shall be in the sole discretion of
Tenant. Such loan(s) may be secured by Tenant assigning to the mortgagee(s)
Tenant's interest in this lease.
(f). It is further understood and agreed that Landlord will subordinate its fee title or leasehold interest to construction mortgage loans .
and or permanent mortgages upon the improvements f< provided they do not becoi
become
•Vkflt five ^ » r , V , M U

' / u i ' C t / V>r,)cl in K;,\ C t»>i ^ t J ^ ' O

personally liable for such indebtedness, and provided, the Landlord is given

» "-

t'« •»

; ** .a \" \ fzc/\\

"" -'

S\

M>

copies of all such transactions in advance of signing; and is allowed to partici<_^r^
pate in supervision of 1±IQ distribution of the funds to assure payment for all
improvements, and provided further that upon any foreclosure the Landlord may
with the other Landowner whose property secures the mortgage, succeed to all
..<*£* "*-

L\
n

< -

<*

right, title'and interest, but no obligation, of tenant in the mortgaged premisesi
/

7.? With respect to any buildings, structures or improvements at any

k/^°time constructed or erected by Tenant on the demised premises, Tenant shall:
(a) Have the right, at its own expense, during the term hereof,
to remodel, alter, add to or modify structurally or otherwise, the buildings
and improvements situated on the demised premises; provided, however, that
before such remodeling, alteration, addition or modification be made, the
Tenant complies with all those requirements set forth in Article 6 (a), (b),
(c), (d), (e) and (f) above and all other applicable provisions in this Lease
enumerated.
(b) At all times during rhe term of this Lease maintain fire and
extended coverage insurance on all buildings and improvements erected the constructed upon the demised premises in insurance companies of generally recognized responsibility and credit, and authorized to do business in the State
of Utah, in the full insurable value thereof and in an amount equal to not

less than seventy percent (70%) of the full insurable value when there is
no lien> with a loss payable clause naming as beneficiaries both Tenant
and Landlord as their interest nay appear. Certificates of such policies
of insurance shall be given to Landlord promptly upon issuance•

In the

event of loss or damage by fire or other casualty* Tenant shall repair'
such damage and restore the building so damaged so thc.t the bo;i«e L-s a\
good condition as prior to such damage or destruction,

^

M l ^ums ari^:.g

by reason of loss under said insurance 'policies shall le available to
Tenant for the reconstruction' or repairing, as the ca.se nay be, : f tuy
building or buildings injured or destroyed, by fire cr other ir.iju.--^: risks•
Should any amount of such insurance proceeds remain ci."i *•.-;• completion and
payment for the work 'performed, such amount, if Tenant be not .in, default
under the terms of this Lease, shall 1« retained by and belong to Tenant*
(e) Tenant agrees that all buildings, structures and improvements shall comply with all laws and ordinances relating thereto,
P, The demised premises may be used by Tenant for any lawful purix>y<' •

9. Tenant shall have the right to assign and

transfer this Lease

or any interest therein, and Tenant shall have the further right /to siiblet,
frcm time* to.time,. ther; demised premises or any part thereof; provided, however, that ncrfassiignment shall constitute a "novation", unless Tenant shall
assign and transfer the Tenant's interest in this Lease on the following
conditions:
(a) That any such Assignee is a party having, a bona

w.

fide net worth of not less than One Million Five Hundred

Thousand ($1,500$,000,00) Dollars and that such Assignee
shall assume all obligations of Tenant 1 lereunder and agrees
to be bound by the terms of this Lease.,
(b) That Tenant shall have completed and fully paid
for all the improvements required by its sublease with
S, S« Kresge Company, comprising not less than sixty four
thousand" (84,000) square feet of building-on this property
and property adjacent to the premises and all on-site improvements ,.

(c) That S. S. Krosge Company has occupied the
buildings under a sublease from Tenant wherein the herein described premises are included as a necessary and
integral part of the S. S. Kresge Company leasehold for a
term of not less than twenty five (25) years.
10. With respect to any buildings ,. structures or improvements
constructed on the demised premises by Tenant, Tenant covenants and agree
that it will, at its own expense! during the continuance of this Lease,
keep such buildifigs, structures and improvements in good repair, and at t
expiration of the term, or any renewal or extension thereof, yield and
deliver up the same in good condition, reasonable wear and use thereof an
damage by the elements or other cause of casualty not customarily insured
against by fire and extended coverage insurance policy excepted.
11. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord
frcen any liability for damages to any person or property in, on, about
or in connection with said demised premises from any cause whatsoever*,
and Tenant will procure and keep in effect during the term hereof adequate
personal injury and property damage liability insurance naming Landlord as
an additional insured and shall reasonably deliver copies of certificates oi
memoranda of such insurance to Landlord.
12. In the event that the estate created hereby shall be taken ij
execution or by other process of law, or if Tenant shall be adjudicated ii
solvent or bankrupt pursuant to the provisions of emy state or federal insolvency or bankruptcy act, or if a receiver or trustee of the property o
Tenant shall be appointed by reason of Tenant's insolvency or inability tc
pay its debts, or if any assignment shall be made of Tenant's property foi
the benefit of creditors, then and in any of such events, Landlord may, ai
Landlord's option, terminate this Lease and all rignts of Tenant hereundei
by giving to Tenant notice in writing of the election of Landlord to so
terminate; provided, however, if:
(a) The order of court creating any of the disabilities
enumerated in this article be not final by reason of pendency of the
proceedings or appeal frcm such order; or

(b) Tenant shall become a debtor seeking corporate or other
reorganisation

under the terir.3 of Chapter 10 of the present National Bank-

ruptcy Act or any other .similar bankruptcy act, or any other similar provisions of any present or future act; then Landlord shall rot have, the
right to terminate and cancel this Lease by reason of any of the dis-'
abilities enumerated herein, so long as Tenant pays to Landlord all amounts
payable by Tenant to Landlord hereunder in full as and vhij.n the same become
due and payable,
(c) Lease be terminated in pursuance hereoi ,, Lajrllord reserves
all 1 lis rights and remedies against Tenant to the same extent as .if such
Lease w(,- : : ^* terminated.
Zx. is hereby agreed that in the event of Tenant herein holding
over aftc' tr^ termination of this Lease, .thereafter the tenancy shall be
from month to month in the absence of a vjritten agreement to the contrary.
14.

In the event default shall be made by Tenant in the payment of

rent upon the day it becomes due and payable and such default continues for
a period cf ten (10) days after date of mailing to Tenant of written notice
thereof, as per paragraph 25 hereof, or if default shall 'be made or suffered
by Tenant in any of the other covenants and conditions of this Lease required
to be kept or performed by Tenant (other than payment of rent) and Tenant
fails to cure such default or defaults within sixty- (60) days after mailing
to Tenant of written notice from Landlord specifying the default or defaults
complained of, then and in any such event or events, and whenever and as
often as such failure or default shall occur, Landlord may pursue any remedies
allowed by law and it shall and may be lawful for Landlord, at Landlord' s
election, at any time thereafter to re-enter into and repossess the premises and
the 'building(s) and improvements situated thereon, and every part thereof, and
Tenant and each and every other occupant to remove and put out, In the event
that.Tenant.fs default (other than non-payment of rent) is not cured within said
\ sixty (60) day period by reason of labor troubles, war, government regulations,
jjj / unavailability of materials, or any condition beyond Tenant's reasonable control,
|<v the time for curing such default shall be extended accordingly.
15.

If the whole or more than ten percent (10$) of the buildings to

be located on the combination of the leased premises and all other

adjoining

property initially leased to S. S. Kresge Company by Tenant, s)iall be
taken by any public authority under the power of eminent domain, then
the term of this Lease shall cease en the part so taken from the day the
possession of that part shall be required for any public purpose , and the
rent shall be paid up to tlat day and from that day the Tenant shall have
the right to either cancel this Lease and declare the same null and void
or to continue in the possession of the remainder of the same under the
terms herein provided, except that the rent shall be reduced in proportion
to the value of the premises taken, to the value of the remaining premises,
and that such right to cancel or declare null and void shall expire unless exercised by written notice to Landlord within sixty (60) days after the taking of
possession for public purpose.
If tto whole or more than ten percent (10%) of the land, comprising
the combination of the leased premises and all other .adjoining property
initially leased to S, S. Kresge Company by Tenant, shall be taken by any
public authority under the power of eminent domain without suitable replacement for the part so taken, then the term of this Lease, at the option of
Tenant shall cease on the part so taken from the day -the possession of that
part shall be required for any public purposes, and the rent shall be paid up
to that day and from that day the Tenant shall have the right to either cancel
this Lease and declare the same null and void or to continue in the possession
of the remainder of the same'under the terms herein provided, except that the
rent shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the premises taken to the
value of the remaining premises. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the
contrary, neither party shall have the right to cancel this Lease, unless S.S.
Kresge Company or its successor, as principal sole Tenant in possession, elects
to terminate because of such taking for public purpose, and tenant shall not
be entitled to any reduction of rental unless Kresge1 s rental is proportionately
reduced.
If such taking shall occur prior to the time Tenant has erected or
constructed any building(s) or structures(s) upon the demised premises, then
all damages awarded therefor shall belong to and be the property of the Landlord, whether such damages shall be awarded as compensation for diminution
in value to the leasehold or to the fee of the premises herein leased; pro-

vided, however, that the Landlord shall not be entitled to any portion of
the award made to Tenant for loss of business. If such taking occurs
after Tenant has erected or constructed on the demised premises any building(s) or structure(s), then out of any damages avjarded for such taking the
Landlord shall pay to the Tenant a sum agreed to by the parties, or a fair
and just portion thereof, as provided by ] aw in determination of the tenant's
interest in the condemnation award,
3 6, Nothing in this Lease contained shall be construed as limiting
the rights of Tenant to mortgage its interest in the demised premises and in
the building(s) at any time thereon, it being understood that the Tenant may
mortgage its estate or interest to secure a bona fide loan or loans of money •
then made or about to be made to the Tenant, or to extend or renew the same,
provided,, however, that no mortgagee nor anyone who claims by, through or
under such mortgage shall by virtue of such mortgage enjoy any greater or more
extended rights than the Tenant has under this Lease*, arid provided, further,
that any such mortgage and the' rights and interests of the mortgagee and of
all persons claiming by, through or under such mortgage, shall be in every
respect subject and subordinate to all the conditions, privileges and covenants of this Lease and the rights, powers and privileges of the Landlord herein, including the priority of interest of Landlord to all parties except the
first mortgagee for improvements.
1 7. Upon the termination of tl lis Lease, whether by lapse of time
or otherwise, all buildings and improvements then and at such time upon
said demised premises shall belong to Landlord.
18. Tenant shall, at its own expanse, under penalty of forfeiture
and damages, promptly comply with all lawful laws, orders, regulations or
ordinances of all municipal, county and state authorities affecting the
premises hereby leased, and the cleanliness, safety, occupation and use
of the same.
19.

In the event that Landlord shall, during the period covered

by this Lease, obtain possession of said premises by re-entry, summary
proceedings, or otherwise, Tenant hereby agrees to pay Landlord the expense
incurred in obtaining possession of said premises and also all expenses and
commissions which may be paid in and about the letting of the same.

20. It is agreed that each and every of tne rigncs, rsimcdias and
benefits provided by tnis Lcc.se shall bet cumulative and shall not be exclusive of any other of said rights, remedies and benefits, or of any
other rights, remedies and benefits allowed by law.
21. Che or nore waivers of any covenant or condition by Landlord
shall not be construed as a waiver of a further breach of the same covenant or condition.
22. Tenant shall have the following options to extend the term of
this Lease, and at the time of-exercise of the option the Tenant is not in
default hereunder:
(a) An option to extend the term for an additional period of
five (5) years from and after the expiration of the initial lease term.
(b) If such option is exercised. Tenant shall have five (5)
additional, successive options to renew this Lease, each for a term of
five (5) years and each option is conditioned upon the exercise of the renewal option immediately preceding.
(c) All of the options herein granted shall be exercised by
notice in writing to Landlord given not later than one hundred and fifty
(ISO) days prior to the expiration of the then existing lease term, and in
the manner hereinafter provided.
All of the terms and conditions of this Lease shall remain in full
force and effect during any renewal terra(s) except that the annual rental
provided for herein shall be adjusted as of the commencement date of any
extended terra as follows:
(1) At and for an annual minimum rental as set forth hereafter for each option period, p\u5 of one-third (1/3) of any over-ride rentals *"
*

A

paid to the Tenant under the provisions of the "Kresge Lease".
(2) (i) Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($12,600.00)
per year for the first five year option extension per3.od beginning on the
Co

1 ~~ day of # m ^ u s t

19??and ending on the 1 f day of O u Lj

<®og 'j

,J

iil)

Thirteen Thousard Eight Hundred Sixty Dollars ($13,860.00)

per year for the second five year option extension period beginning on the
,P^
/

I-

day of PtAr t^ . T- l$° Sand ending on the

] ( day of v*\ u ^j

*& £<^s

(iii) fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty Six Dollars ($15,240.00)

/fff

per year for the third five year option extension period beginning on the
/
took'
>
/^Q^y of A ur r,s< T j» a™* ending on the >/ day of ^JCA L 9

\y^

10 2-tf/j>

(iv) Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy and 60/100 ($16,770,60)
per year for the fourth five year option extension period beginning on the

t

J L : L . W * -::;

M*

;

V^^^T

^ ^

d

endin

o on the //

day of xrTuL.y

V

&

^

,'v) Eighteen Thousand four Hundred Forty Seven and 66/100 ($18,4H7»66)
per year for the fifth live year option extension period beginning on the

<6^
^

I *-~

da

y

rt/j«

f <~< ~t~ *£- and ending on the J (

day of sj'u 'L y

19 20 £

(vi) Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Two and H3/10Q Dollars'($20,292Ji3)
per year for* the sixth five year option extension period beginning on iho J^ '
^ ^
•
:
day of jQurC^T~
3b9-» and ending on the // day of yjo. , y
Jk
2-0'^-^
23, Landlord agrees, to execute at any tamo and from time to time,
such agreements betv;een Landlord hereunder as Owner, Tenant hereunder, as
Landlord, and any or all of Tenant's subtenants as~Tenant(s), covering portions
or all of the demised premises, by which agreement(s) the Landlord (Owner) will
agree that in the event of the termination for any reason whatsoever of this
Lease, if the sublessee is not then in default of its sublease:
(a) Such Subtenant(s) may remain in possession so
.'^/i.iCi' rh. > ..jrcw.,ii.l

\i.\.y>i.

long as obligations owing to Landlord by Tenant remain
A

satisfied; .and such Subtenant(s) shall attorn to and pay
the rent to such Landlord; and
(b) That Landlord will'notify in writing tn.e Subtenant of any default by Tenant and allow Subtenant thirty
(300 days from the date of si ich notice within which to cure
such default,
21-;. Tenant agrees to pursue reasonable conduct to prevent adverse
parties fran gaining prescriptive rights and easements over the leased premises.
25. This Lease shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah.
2.5, All notices provided for in this Lease shall be sent:
To"Landlord;
To Tenant;

1090 East Millbrook Way
Bountiful, Utah 04010
2*; 31 West Alabama Street
ibuston, Texas 77000

24,

Tenant agrees to pursue reasonable conduct to prevent adverse

parties from gaining prescriptive rights and easements over the leased
premises,
25, This Lease shall be interpreted

in eiccordance with the laws

of the State of Utah.
26•

All notices provided for in this Lease shall be sent:
TO Landlord:

1098 East Millbrook Way
Bountiful, Utah 84010

TO Tenant:

3431 West Alabama Street
Houston, Texas 77000

and such other place or places as hereafter shall be designated in writing
by the respective parties. Such notice shall be mailed U. S. Registered
or Certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid,
27.

Landlord covenants that Tenant, on payment of all the afore-

said installments and performing all the covenants aforesaid, shall and may
peacefully and quietly have, hold and enjoy the said demised premises for the
term aforesaid.
28.

Landlord and Tenant agree to execute:> at the time of execution

of this lease or upon request by either party, a short form lease for recording purposes, setting forth the legal description of the property, the
term of this Lease and reference to the option to renew the Lease,
29.

The property depicted on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and made a

part hereof is subject to conaeinnation proceedings by the State of Utah.

In

the event the State of Utah releases this property, or any part thereof, from
the condemnation proceedings and elects to sell said property, or any part
thereof, Landlord agrees to make a reasonable efforn: to purchase said prope. ty
afc the best price possible. In the event the Landlord acquires said property
or any part thereof, Landlord agrees to include so much of said property as
adjoins the south side of leased property, but Landlord may retain any property
south of and/or adjoining Landlord's remaining tract,under the provisions
of tlus Lease, in consideration of "he annual rental payable under the Lease
being increased by ooven per cent (7fl) of the valuation of the property computed
at the rate of OM0,000,00, for each acre added to the Lsase.
30.

The covenants, conditions and agreements of this Lease shall La

Lix.ding u^on and ^lall inure to the benefit of the heirs, representatives,

successors and assigns of the .polities hereto,
31, Landlord and Tenant agree to cooperate in allowing reasonable
access for ingress and egress to and fran their respective leased and
retained tracts,
IN WITNESS IHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents
to be executed all as of the day and year first above written.

WILLILAM K. OLSON
LANDLORD

ft-A,-

*

£••<,

,

BARBARA L. OLSON
WIFE OF LANDLORD
C £ W MANHATfAN ASSOCIATES, a
Limited Partnership
^^__

TENANT
STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF DAVIS )

On this v"|
day of \)ccr: CM l^ r 197 \, before me personally appeared
William K. Olson and Barbara L. Olson, his wife, to me known to be the persons
described in and who executed the within instrument and acknowledged that they
executed the same as their free act and deed,
\

( \

NOTARY PUBLIC

J$y cornnission expires:

STATE OF TAXES

)
ss.

COUtflY OF HARRIS )
/
>
19^>. before me personally appeared
UJJLJ.
,
- , On this &Ci/ day of
/to me known to.be a general partner of
C't W HanhattanAssociates, ac Limited^Partnership, who executed the witliin instrument and acknowledged that he executed^art
the same for and on behalf of C 8 W
Manhattan Associates as a general partner,

NOTARY PUBLIC
ny commission expires:
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EXWniT B

oaid lowed prcwlGco or ony pr»r£ th::roof, but in no Gtfent loxo\:
t;hr.n the 7.0 C acy or ££:£/, 1573, plus (51,67, of cr.o-third o£! ar,y
s d d i c i c u s l or cvor-rido ronttsie paid or accruina t o tho 'itennnt
tntfor tho provisions of the Erc3ga Losso/which oUall bo paid by
Tenant t o Landlord within t h i r t y (30) days following tha d a t e utors
tho oorco bocoas due end poyabXo t o Vlonr.nt under c s i d KrcbfcO Locso.
4«

(&)

Toasut ajjeooo, a t i t o ova onponao, coswasneitts err

tfca date on which t h l c Ground Lsaso to executed by LoGOor, t o pay
t o tho pcblic n u t h o r i t i o o chargod with the c o l l e c t i o n t h e r e o f ,
promptly GO tho ones becorco duo cud pnyabio, e l l tazcoo, c©as::oi cod
e p e c i a i , Goscscr:3ttto and othor public chargoc made upon or cocooood
c&ainflt tho dcralcttd prcdoafl sad cny b u i l d i n g , otructurco or icprcvG?
rccuto twro or horcaftor ioeetod thereon, or o r l a i n s i n roopoct of tho
occupancy, uso or poaccccion of tho domiccd proraio'sa and which c;ro
coccscod ond ore or bocourt fl l i o n during tho continuance of t h i s
Lease,

F u r t h e r , Tenant o&reou to pay n i l other chargea, c o e t c , a*:-

ponoea, l i o n s , Witor r e n t s , rotcc cad l i c e n s e feao, i n c l u d i n g b a t
not limited to water, e l e c t r i c i t y , &ZQ, telephone,, cower, other
u t i l i t i o a , e t c . , to the ond that r e n t e s h a l l bo received by Landlord
unabctcd by any catch chor^co.

Tenant acreao to remit promptly t o

Landlord, copies of paid rccoipta with rcopoct to taxoc, and on
•demand, rccoipto evidencing payasnt of a l l CDCCUflutsnta or othor
public chcrueo co payable by "tenant•

A l l ouch Waco on lend c a l y

for tho f i r c c fcnd I c a t yo&ro of tho t e r u hereof c h s l l bo e q u i t a b l y
prorated between the p a r t i e s , t e n a n t t o poy e l l tcscco on tiaprovcy/.^ntc •
(b)

Toncnt c h a l l not be o b i i c a t o d , hov;jvor, t o pay r.\y<y

income tc;*, p r c f i t o t a x , excise t o : or other tax or d u r ^ o tfcet tJiy
bo payable by or chargeable to Lcndlerd under tiny p r o c l ^ t c!^Ci:'a:vo.
Inw of tho United 0 to too or thu Ctuto i n uhich tha deraioad p r o f i t v- ,.
ore located, or lanesod by any p o l i t i c a l taking cubdivlcion t librae J
or cny gevcrnniotctai r.goncy, upon cr u i t h recpact t o tho r e n t rcncivc.d
by LctCvdlord under thic Lccco or upon tho r i g h t of Landlord t o rcccivr;
ouch ronta or t o do bualncco,
(c)

Tenant c h i l l not bo o b l i f t e d to pay c\ny ii\hiri(::;r/;^ P

Crer«/;f0r, c c t a t o , ouccoowion or other c f n i l a r kctz or clvirrp tlz-t i'-y
* arid 30.?/' of ono t h i r d oC any ovcrrido r e n t a l o paid by o t h e r uubtnrmntr, or 3ft.?A
of ono t h i r d of ono ^orcont of a)\ nalco mado by othor occunants of dor.;icod
promi3Cu wldclKiVor in ^routor (appliuu a l s o to 22, (c) ( l ) )
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•.

;,-n, :.. . ,

showing l : h . J L U .
rcarkoccblei

< ~ '•.,;.,;iu!i.:n:i.C'.i

' r d \ o r c i * ,.1»»

-

to tiwc 4

..i ua J r.#.ct\, ..' „ t h e To lis lit m2y> fro.n
u T; fur^a^i

c.r^-tio»

•

. - i.o; .1,1 h e r e o f ,

:.

::...-,•

L\»; * v . e x p e n s e 3 c o n s t r u c t upon .4.'.", o r

any p e r t .<: t'..- dcrciacd premises> new b u i l d i n g end itr.y.rev-• i ^ t j i n i u
th.'i ^ a l l o t t i n g c o n d i t i o n s ;
(o)

/'ill improvenrjnta and now b u i l d i n g sha.i.,

[r.oo<l :ir:d f.ubnfccntial. ch.v.i.r;c(:or t.,p,'\ r.wch >:\r, \ylll

•

. •

n o t i;.*nit; ::o d-'-'

ti.iV v ^ l ; ^ ox i:ii'.: land li.atv.!>y dor.iirjcd.
(b)

TChat Tcnnnc o h s l i

n.2tcrialc furnished

;• : ^ . ^ . ^ . . . ^

;

.

4

. .d end

i n or about tu.; cro.cti.on "..:* -->;v;r. i-u^r, o '

c u - h bui.l.din[,G i:nd ir.>provoTr,vnt«, and keen the dcmi«ccJ p*i.ct»;isc:i o;\d
b u i W l v * ^ ov/j Hvprovcir.cnti; tlv:vr-:on ::t a)J. tiruus i r c e and c l e a r oi:
i\mu. ii.'jn'j xo-j Jabor or wK:i;ori...'J.u .Cuv/uii'dicd i n and al»c\it r.ucli c r c c t i o / : fi:;d conDU-ucsr-iov^ :ind will. doCond; ai: i t a own c c c t and ^ui^jv.e,
cT.r;.!-t «>v; ovory Aicn ; : ^ c i ; t c d 0;: c l a i m iiil.nd /i;^ino(: £C'J.J pixmineo

lor labor elaiucd to havo been so performed or material clai.vic)

Co

have been no furnished, and promptly pay each and every judgmdu: .,.lUd0i
or jyiven a^'in-Jt said preiiiccs, or any parr; thereof, or the Luildlu-.a
and/or improvei^;u.a thereof, and/or against Landlord 07; Tenant* ou
account of any ouch lien and indemnify and .save harmless tho Laudlord, i t s uuccassorc a ad assigns, *"«"•* a l l and every e.iaim and Action
on account of nuch claim, lion or j a d v e n t •. Thau no c o n s t r u c t i o n
ohnll be commenced without a completion and performance bond in th<*
smount of tha estimated t o t a l construction cost by a corporate p.urcty
caving i-^3 Landlord ai\d the loaned prcwirca harmless from any and
a l l claim:: oi? c r e d i t o r s oi: any kind and s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y tha
c o n t r a c t o r ' s bead i n s requirement of tha tttato of Utah, guarantee i»g
timely performance to tha s a t i s f a c t i o n of Kros&o under an executed
Exhibit "J?1 (Xan^nt-S. S# Kres^a Co, Lcate), and saving Landlord
harmless from loan re emit lug from non-performance of the Tenant's
construction obligations? under tha ICrcsge Lease.
(c)

All ouch conct7:uction and the completed buildings*

(shall comply with a l l laws and ordinances r e l a t i n g thsvrcto.
(d)

Ho building s h a l l be demolished or s u b s t a n t i a l l y

reduced in value during the f i n a l five (3) years of tha Loaoe term
or any renewal term, option for which has been exercised by Tenant,
efcecpi; i f cams io destroyed by fi.ro or other casualty*

Nothing i n

t h i s Paragraph d u l l abrogate &,L\y of tho recjuiramcats of A r t i c l e V
and A r t i c l e 10 of t h i s Lease.
(a)

To finance the construction of nuch improvements i f

and'when they may be constructed, tbo Tenant s h a l l have the r i g h t to
borrow mousy for jiuch purposes for both interim and end financing.
The terms and conditions of nuch inortcace(s) chaJl be in the cole
d i s c r e t i o n of Tenant.

Such loan(s) pay bo secured by Tenant asai^u-

ins to the m o r t i c e ( 0 ) Tenant 1 6 i n t e r e s t in this Lease,
(f)

I t L\ further ;*ndcr;;tooc and agreed that Landlord

w i l l subordinate i t s few t i t l e .or leasehold i n t e r e s t to construction
iliort^a^o loan.'; ^nd/or ponaaricmt merr.f;a&cs upon 'the impruvcmcinti.'
executed prior to tho co»»t\:cpnop.?ni: 0;: t h i s ICACO term, provided i t
does not become personally l i a b l e for cuch liidubtedncss, t h a t Ll:i«

.„ «u):«i'y bond in ttnragraoli 6(b) above ie l a ui-jece, UK,*,
f',.n h.v« a valid cuMna^e with Kreistys fiuWiMntitflly in £ l V l | |
,.i- i n h i b i t

n

)) u , and that t i e Landlord ir, [\\von copier, o/f a l l

KiicSi t r a n s a c t i o n in advance o£ Hirnin?, and * y nllo«ed t o parr.lci"
waco in nupervir.ion of the d i s t r i b u t i o n o£ the £und(; to aiuuvro p^y~
ir.ont fc'cr a l l iiaprovoinoritav and provided l u r t h s r t h a t upon miy fore*
closure the Landlord way with the other Uniclowaur' whoco property
cocurou the mortgage, cueceed to a l l r i g h t , t i t l e and internal:, hut
no; obligationj of Tenant in the mortgaged prer.iicca.

All ouch i«oj.'fc-

EPS© inafcrumsnta ehall.gtv£ Landlord ths rijjbt uo be n o t i f i e d by
the rrtorfc&asce o£ any default by Tenant and tlw further rif # ht to
cure any default which may e x i s t under tiny instrument connected
with such iftortya^ loans.
7.

With ran pact: to any b u i l d i n g , Btructures or improve-

ments tit any tii»i3 constructed or erected by tenant on the de raised
preraiGoc;, Tenant s h a l l ;
(a)

Have the r i g h t , a t i t c own exponas, during the torn;

hereof, to remodel, filter, add t o or modify s t r u c t u r a l l y or' otherwise, the b u i l d i n g end improvements situated on tho dcaviacd
preuiitiGf!; provided, however, t h a t before cuch remodeling, a l t e r a t i o n ,
addition or modification be made, the Tenant corapliea with a l l thcuc
roquireiTiAntn eat iforth in Avtielc' 6 ( a ) , (b), ( c ) , ( d ) , ' ( « ) and (y)
above and a l l other applicable provisions in uhio Lcasu enumerated.
(b)

At a l l tirnec during the term. oi! thic Lease maintain

£iro and extended coverage incuawnce on a l l b u i l d i n g aucl improvements erected end constructed upon the ciosAioocl premieer. in iir:urar.ca
coiupanieo of generally recogniiscd r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and c r e d i t , and
authorised to do'business in tho State oil Utah, in the f u l l inuurablo value there.oi: i\\ the event a m o r t i s e or other l i e n cxiata OK
said bui'idin^c or improvements, and in an amount o<jual to not lout;
than 7071 of: \±?. l u l l insurabl* vclue vluui thovc ir. no l i e n , with r.
losu: payable clause nandnj; au beneficiaries bd:h vrausmt and Lavu31o::d
ao t h e i r intcrcstfJ n.'ty appear.

Ccrtilieace:; o£ r.lich policies oif

insurance ohali be /;ive»i to landlord proi.^c'i.y upon jfocuancw. 7M
tlitt event

0t;;

iMU

or

<:-n,-^o by f i r e or other i:ar*ualty, '/nnani: (JI..:1J.

repair tuch dcuragrj and rv.\.(.ore the ]^ilnin;; so d a r n e d
PUUC

co

t - lUil .

, ; .,

it) iu.Ga £.ood condition ns' prior to ?;uah drmaj/j or dact:riu:t.; 0 o.

All ciw.3 ariein;; by r e ^ o r , of lo:;c under aald incinranee police:;,
eh«Il be available to Vi:»v?nt lor the reconstruction or r e p a i r i n g .
os the case r^y bo, of any building or buildings ih;;urcd or dor;troyed by f i r e or other Uc mrcd rifiUUt

Should any amount of cixh

inf. lira nee proceeds re wain after completion end payment for the work
pcrioruod, sruch amount, If Tenant be not in default under the torr.vj
of t h i s L ' j a s e , ahull be retained by and bo long t:o Tenant,
(c) • Tenant afp:oa;j that a U - b u i l d i n g , s t r u c t u r e s and
improvementa 6 h a i l comply uUh a l l la\;s end ordinances r e l a t i n g
thereto.
0,

The doidaed promises may be used by Tenant for any

lawful purpose,
9,
IQQCQ

Tenant ehall have the r i g h t to assign end t r a n s f e r thia

or any i n t e r c u t therein, and Tenant s h a l l have the further

r i g h t to s u b l e t , from time'to time, the domiced premise*; or any p a r t
thereof; provided, however, that no flsoignsaftnL: s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a
"novation", unless Tenant a hull assijyn ar.-3 transfer the Tenant* a
i n t e r e s t in t h i s Lease on the following conditions:
(a)

That any cuch astti^nco in a party hnviaj a bona

fide not worth of not leso than One Million Vive Hundred Thousand
($1,500,000,0:*))

froilara,

and rhat cuch as/j;L<u:ou s h a l l as;r,u>,ta a l l

obligations of Tenant hereunder nxid n^re'ea to be bound by thr> tirrms
of t h i s Lease,
(b)

That Tenant s h a l l have completed and f u l l y p:\id for

#11 the iijprofver,\enta required by i t s rubleace with ft. S. Kruc-go
Company, eo;.ip-.;i«inii not luGfs than i;ixtyi : 6ur .Vuousand (04,000)
sc;urrc feet of building on this property and property ^ujneent. to
the p?;oaiir.ea and a l l oiV'Sito improvements.
(c)

Tint S. S, Kre £0 Co.-.ipany lia« occupied the. buiidin:;;;

under a n u b l c ^ e fror.i Tenant wherein the herein described pre.::iiej
are included a:, a nocuusary ana integcnl part of tha H. S, '/re!.;;/:
Company leasehold for a torn of not le;;e than tuanty-fivs OM :/••;;:..:,.
10,

Uith rorjpeet to any b u i l d i n g , .structure;] \.r .'.r..;-'••—'*

monta constructed on tlu) uV.fliry.d proni.".C!J by T^nan':, •i'an'Mf: cw -••

.

%JnVcoa

tlii:K i t w i l l , nt i to own e>:p-j;uiu, dujria. u...

Cl ,

....c» af this 1.00:30, keen such b u i l d i n g , s t r u c t u r e s ami '..ifmrc•.•••..
f..nt:;

in ceod r e p a i r , cue! at the expiration of the tor»t.3 or any

Kt!jr.:wni

or

extension thereof, yield end deliver up the. aa.au. in rV.v..;

condition, reasonable wear and use thereof ami cJa.«U[#;a by the clep'-nu
or other cause or casualty not customarily insured against: by f i r e
ond extended coverage insurance policy excepted.
11.

Tonr.nt agrees to indemnify Gad hold harmless the

Landlord £roa any l i a b i l i t y for dar::ar(as to any person or property
i n , on, about or in connection with «aid demised proinifiec frou any
cause vAia'cucover; and "o riant v:ill procure and keep in e f f e c t during
the torsi hereof adequate personal injury and property don^ge l i a b i l i t y
insurance in amounts of not loss than $200,000 for any oaa pardon*
$500,000 for one accident or occurrence, and $50,000 property daj.v.trra,
naming Landlord as an additional insured and, s h a l l reasonably d e l i v e r
copies or c e r t i f i c a t e s or rrujfuoranda of such insurance to Landlord.
12.

In the event that the e s t a t e created,hereby s h a l l -bo

taken in'execution or by other process of lavj, or if Tenant s h a l l bo
adjudicated insolvent or bankrupt pursuant to the provisions or ony
s t a t e or federal insolvency or bankruptcy a c t , or if a receiver or
t r u s t e e of the property of Tenant s h a l l be appointed by reason of
Tenant's insolvency or i n a b i l i t y to pay i t s d e b t s , or if cvny Mrjisnwent s h a l l he luadc u£ Tenant's property for the benefit or creditor;?,
then a)\C in any of liucfi events, Landlord u.Cvy„ a t Landlord 1 a option,
terminate this Lea&e and a l l r i g h t s of Tenant hereunder by ^.ivins
to Tenant notice in writing of the e l e c t i o n of Landlord to so
terminate; provided, hov:cvor,
(a)

if:

The order of court creating any of the d i s a b i l i t i e s

enumerated in t h i s A r t i c l e bo not f i n a l by reason oil pendency of
the proceeding or appeal from such order: or
(b)

Tenant ch::ll he. s/no a debtor seeking corporate or

othsr reorj/nvlr.atioi'i under the tersr.y of Chapter/10 of the present
r.ritioiwJ. Bankruptcy Act or any other similar bankruptcy a c t , or rn.y
other sli.iilar provision:) of any p-iescnt or, future act.; tlwn Landlo/d
r.hail not II^IVO the ri[,ht to tor t .\i.pete and cauvol \:hi.r. 'inu^.c by x'* '* •''-

of any oc the dlsriblj.-j tj,..., .r.uwera ted b e r s i n , no lo;i- an T'?n*:r,«:
to Landlord-all rtn'>unt::« jviyrtlnV by Tenant to Landlord hereup.^.v

^

full M« and when tin r.i:-v R'cor'jo duo and payable.
(a)

X^.CJ'O

1,,-/ taviu.toalwJ in # I?UV5U2IK:« hereof, Landlord

reserves, n i l hia r i - h j n and r e a d i e s against Sonant to the sa,:j3
extent as i f cuch T..o;u*o wore not torminat«.•('.
13.

Tt i:; hereby agreed t h a t in thc-i event of Tenant herein

holding over a f t e r ' t h e termination of thia L?afl«, thereoftor' the
tenancy nhall be from juonth'to month in the absence of a w r i t t e n
agreement to :uh& contrary, v::»tU the uanvj terra as herein otated '
applicable t o the extant they <Hr« consistent with •'* month to Month
tenancy.
Vu

In. ths event default o h a l l bo made by Tenant i n tha

payment of any aur.tfj duo hsroiuiJer upon the day they become duo and
payabla and such default continues for a period of ten (10) daya
a f t e r date of :i.ailing to Tormt of w r i t t e n notice thereof, as per
Paragraph 26 boreof, or i f default ohall be icado or suffered by Ton:.;.::
i n any of the other covenants and conditions of t h i s Leant* rfcejuirod
to be kept or pfjrfornod by Tanant (other than payment of woncsy) and
• Tenant f a i l s to cure such default or dcfuulta within Gi:;ty (60) day;
a f t e r walling to Tenant of written notice from landlord spoclfyin:;
the default or defaults cow'plained of, than and in any such event
or eventsj and whenever and as often at? euch f a i l u r e or default shr.15
occur, Landlord inay pursue any rorcsdiea allowed by law and il* rsh.?13.
and ray be lawful for Land lord, a t Landlord* e e l e c t i o n , a t any tis.vj
t h e r e a f t e r , to r e - e n t e r i n t o and. ropoci.cso the provriocc and tbe
b u i l d i n g s ) and improve .r.entci aitu&ted thereon, and every part th^rcc* .
and Tenunt and each and every other :ccupant to remove and put ouC,
In the 'event t h a t Tenant's default (other than non-payment of ;:;oj;'V)
U not cured within said s t a t y (GO) day period by reason of labor
t r o u b l e s , war, governnftnt ret//'a tior.es, u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of iv.atevi.:. -•.
or any condition beyond Tenant? reasonable c o n t r o l , tbo t i r e for
curing ouch default s h a l l be r.-tond^d accordingly.
If/,

If the whole or ir.oro than ten percent (10Z) oC t)v

halldin^s to Lo lfuotod on th^ e m a n a t i o n of the leasee; p . w . , r ' ;

—9 —

vj

a l t oth*r adjoining propwty i u i t j a l l y leased to 5. S. IVrrojo

: . u ., ;; ,y

by T'.:r.ja!;, islictil bo {;;!a:n by nny public a u t h o r i t y UJHJCV UP,,.

,cn:or or c-wincMit <\}iain, the/: tho term of thin Lous'-' whall cr«.u:c ,v.i
; hc

purt so whan froi.i the day tho por.ricc&ion of that part fthslj. 1,0

required for any public purpose, arid the rent ehctll be* paid up t.o
± a t day and iron; that day tho Tenant s h a l l have" the r i ^ h t to einbo:.oncel thia Lease and declare the aasne n u l l and void or to continue
In the poss;ccr.5.on of the remainder of the car.ie under tho fccrr.s herein
provided, encept that the rent n b a l l be reduced in proportion t o
the value of : the preroioacstaken, t o the value o f ' t h e regain in;?, pvo;.v
iuQB, and t h a t cuch r i y h t to cancel .or declare n u l l and void siv:»U
er.pirc uulo&c c»:;c?reii;cd by written, notice to Laudlord within cir.ty
(60) dayo a f t e r the taking of possession for,public purpoiie*
If the \vholo or more thun ten per cent (107r) of the Idu'.,
cowprinliic the combination of the leased preruieeo and"all other
property i n i t i a l l y leased to 8. S. Ki-esjjc Company by Tenant> s h a l l
be taken by any public authority wider the power of cirdnent domain
without s u i t a b l e replacement"for the part so taken, then the tovrm oC
thic Lease, a t the option of 'fenrmt t h a l l cease on the part ao tab-;.*
from the day the possession of that part s h a l l ' b e required for any
public purpoaea, and the rent aha!! be paid up to t h a t <i&y %snd from
that dc\y the Tenant OTJUII have the r i g h t to c i t h e r cancel t h i s Lecu^
and decloro th? cair.c null an;] void or to continue in th:-? porjeeacic:;
of the remainder of tho -casici under the tern;5 herein provided, c:ceo;V.
that the r e n t c h a l l be reduced in proportion to the value of t).v..»
prewiceri taken to the value of the rersainins preiaiffeo.

^otwithr^'*', •••

ing anything f coritained hereto to the contrary, neither party s h e l l
have the r i g h t to cancel this Lcasa, ualc.su S. 3, Krc-sgc Company cr
itfi successor, a a ' p r i n c i p a l sole Tenant in possession, e l e c t s to
tewninato because of yuch taking for public purpose, and Tenant ;•!"•'*•
not be e n t i t l e d to ony r e d u c t i ' 1 of r e n t a l unless Krosge's rcnt«*:i
is pruportiunjtely reduced.
If ench taking rh.tll occur prj.or t o tho tir:,c Tenant \u •
oructod or construe red U'II; ).^i)ilcl;.n^(^) or atructur^r;) upon the d •'«'•'
pre^hjcb^ thca w)J. <h/i.v,|>\'.; awarded rhcrefor s h a l l bclonr;, to a;:d \ •'

— 10 —

the property of tiw LcudJmrd, whether such da-nages s h a l l he aw.rdod
as compensation for d-ininution in value to the leasehold or to the
fee of; the. prcnlser. herein leased; provided, h o o v e r , t h a t l\ v Lond~
lord s h a l l not re e n t i t l e d to any portion of tl\c award IUVJS to T^.r/jt
for loso* of business.

If such taking occurs a f t e r Tenant his erected

or constructed on the caiaiaod premises nr.y build i n s (c) or s t r u c t u r e ^
then out of any damages awarded for such raking the Landlord d u l l
pay to the Tenant a sum agreed to by the p a r t i e s , or a f a i r and j u r e
p o r t i o n thereof, as provided by law in determination of tha Tenant's
i n t e r e s t i n tiy?. condemnation award.
16.

nothing in tJil.fi Lease contained s h a l l be construed cw,

l i m i t i n g the r i g h t s of Tenant to mortgage i t s i n t e r e s t in the .deivdccd
premises r.nd in the b u i l d i n g ( s ) a t any tirae t h e r e o n , i t being understood t h a t the Tenant ir-ay wort gags i t s e s t a t e or i n t e r e s t t o secure
a bona fide loan or loans of money then rcado or about t o be uujde to
the Tenant, or .to extend or renew the same, provided, however, that
no mortgagee nor anyone \)ho clfliais by, through or under such mortgage
s h a l l by v i r t u e of such mortgage enjoy nny g r e a t e r or more extended
r i g h t s than the Tenant has under this L c a a e j a n d provided,

further,

t h a t any such mortgage and the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of the mortgagee
and of all

persons claiming by, through or under such mortgage, aha.ll

be in every respect subject and subordinate to a l l the c o n d i t i o n s ,
p r i v i l e g e s and covenants c.f this Lease ar.:! the r i g h t s , powers r.nd
p r i v i l e g e s of the Landlord h e r e i n , including the p r i o r i t y of i n t e r e s t
of Landlord to s l i p a r t i e s except the f i r s t ' m o r t g a g e e for inprovemerits, i f any there be, executed pursuant to Paragraph C hereinabove.
17.

Upon the termination of t h i s Lease, whether by lapse

of time or /otherwise, a l l buildings and improve:iants then and at such
time upon said demised precises s h a l l belong t o Landlord.
IS.

Tenant s h a l l , a t i t s o w expense, under penalty of

f o r f e i t u r e and damages, prompt'/.y comply with a l l lav?ful la^jc, orders,
r e g u l a t i o n s or ordinances of a l l municipal, county and s t a t e authori t i e s a f f e c t i n g the premises hereby leased', and the c l e a n l i n e s s ,
s a f e t y , occupation anu use of the sa»,:e.
19.

In the event that Landlord s h a l l , during the period

covered by t h i s Lear.o, obtain pejecction of caid premises by rc-r.ntry

/;u.'...v.try ;ii:ouccCLr\i/:

> o r o.u:,«i.-jJL-:\:;

X e u a u t aorcivy tftfco.u** ;.o ;>..y \tt

».

lord the expense incurred in'obtaining postffcSttion o'c r.ald ;.n'ci.-(.».:^.v
ttii.;l oUo .*J 11 L'^;i.:r*Mii*. and co.u.'a.Uwsiuu;; uhich luay bo paid in cv.d ei.ou;:
the l e t t i n g of zi\ct iuu?;«.
20*

I t is agreed thet oaeh and every of the l i ^ h t i i , rc;-,/>

dies and benuiittf provided by tl.iii» Loa^c .'iholl be cumulative and ybali
uoj be exclusive? ox any other of /•aid r i ^ h t a , ro/aedica and benefits*,
or oi any otheir r l y l i t c , rciiusdico and benefits allowed by low.
21,

One or wore waivorc, of any covenant or condition by

Landlord s h a l l not be -cons trued aa a waiver of a further breach of t h .
con/3 covenant or condition.
22.

Tenant s h a l l have the following options to csiteud the

term of this L?.a«cs, if a t the tlu;a or axe re ice- of the option the
Xcnanfc is not in oofault hereunder;
(<0

An oprion to extend tho toiin for an addition::! period

of live. (%j) years frera and offer the expiration of the i n i t i a l , ioc.eo
term,
(b)

If such option "ia exorcised, Tenant s h a l l have five

(S) addition*!, cuceer.ijive options to renew this U-auej, each for a
'turui of five (5) years tine each option is conditioned upon the excrete a of the renewal option i;:»r-odlately preceding.
(c)

All of the options heroin granted c h a l l be exercised

by notice in wri'izing to Landlord jjivca not l a t e r then one htuurad
and f i f t y (150) ilsys prior to the expiration of the thsn-orJ.stin:.;
lease term, and in the i.&nuor hereinafter provided.
Ail of the ttvruid end 'conditions of this Lease, s h a l l r ^ ^ i n
in l u l l force and of feet during any renewal term (a) except t h a t t!v.»
annual r e n t a l -provided ior herein .'shell be adjusted as of the
co^.encouent dftto of any extended tt-r.iii as follows?
(.1)

At and for en annual juiiiiwu^ r e n t a l as r o t

forth hereafter for each ^ptiou period, plu;> 61.CX of o.vetlvird (1/2) of .my addition-:*! or ovcr-ric-o rentals, paid to
the Tenant under the previa iua-, of the nKre?;^e LenGo",
(2) (1) !!V?nLy v;*uH::;and Four Hundred Uollare
f/^r

(020,400,00) per year for the C.!J;B*.; five-yi-.ar option c.;<:,»?••
•>• •

/ V

aion period bcrpArai::;* on tir.j , . , / j ^ day of ^^miLLSC^^

• ••Zft-

,md civlina on r.V* J ? / _ , Uly , v , 0 j ^ / / „ _

,

^Z^OO'l

(11) 'JV'.Miry-'lT.io Thou:\'W;d Four iluiu^rofl 'rorty
Vtolinrr. (£2V.'-r>.0O) -c>r yew for the- cc.-ocr.-.i* fivc-yor.r

*//

y/

option orccsnaion voric/» bc^inrrln,;; on trliv

/ - ; ^ day of

]9-iLfrt*j>Jl^i

?APJ> -*- c-nc'inj; on the ,?/.;£ <lny o£

3uLLs{

> &Q£<T
( i i i ) Twrity-?om: TV,u:\'Kid Sir. Hundred E i g h t y

Four Dollars ($!7'.,('*':,00) pc-v vc-o.v for the third fivc-y>o J:
/

tfv
J

option e.xfconcion psrio-l boj'Jnuirr', on thft .„.JL™ r'°y
>Jlj&yC±i.lZ.> 2 % ?

£!!

>* °^t5/:- on the J ? / _ ^y

ry

*

of

(iv) Twavi!;y-.SC:v:sn TJuvjsfnad One Hundred F i f t y Two
^

anc! 40/100 Hollars (027,152.*0) jv.r,: y*or Tor the fourth
.five-yo:ar op!:icn or; ton* ion period bo^inrJnf. on tlv« JJzZL
° - ^Jkij-hi-ZIi 2A/3>

.

<1r},v1

()

^lT

^W'ivuj cm tho _ J _ L day of

(v) Tvnnty-iiitvv Thousand Eijjht Hundred 8i:a:y~Savfca
and 64/100 Hollars ($?.?,S67.G';) per yonr for tho i'ifth
l

i ?
£ivu-yei»r option extension pnriocK bc^irminft on th* j^J^L.

day o£ /Vvi^u-.^ ^" , SLOjfjr; and ending on tl»e J ? J L _ day oi!

^

(vi) Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Pif;ty-i'c«rr
«nd /.0/100 Dollars ($32,r,SA,40) sor yc,*<r for the sJ.Mth
, S

A

fivv'i-ycar option *o:;fonf»ion period, beginning on tho / ^T
a •
'
t,aV °^ r /9; LA )- < - y /T» ^ . . ^ r,/| -' Gw'i'tfJ o n the ^JJV.^ O&y O':'J
?3*

Landlord a^rcca, to orient:) fit ar.y tin* nr.d fron

t i n o to t i r o , 'ouch o^roer.vcmtr. br;tv;oon ViviOifird bora trader a:; Ojrirjx
Tenant hereunder, an Landlord> and.any or a l l oS Tenant's cubt^v.A
covering portions or a l l of tho defined ^ r c n i c ^ , by vhich oj.v?:sr.K:nt(<;) thv. L-ndlor.-; (Own.-;::) • i l l n^:*:* tbnt in th'2 cvrrd; of l.:h-.
tctrrrdncrtiori for :i.ny re*?, son v;b..-i:Gonvor or tb:!.« L**.'<«:>, i£ t';^ •vjhJ.csii'Cft :I.G not tb.cn in c'ef/rjlt: of i t s iv^bVMtta:
(n)

SucVi sv.V;Miv*rit(!s) w\y r.cwr.in io po:::^f^»icn ::o lcv%..\

C:R a l l tb/j obliyitio:-..:) ovlnj to l.r.tWIo::-.1 by Von^n*, wwon tb:•.:'» C-v-

j,< .:;<•«: rn.^.iu scuisfiod;, Mid fcueh f,uh;:.ouant(:0 fchall a;::;«.. n
.j~y

0.1.1 CIUD3 CJUC I J u d e r f h i l .

(b)

lt

GVOlUlJ 1,3 a U : t O S u c h L S i ' l d l o t O ; , ; , { .

V'ua;; Landloru w i l l notify in writing the

J.UV.LC

•,.:.:•-,••

of any deiaulf by Tenant and ollou hubteunat t h i r t y (SO) ^ciy;. i\iv.A
tho date of such notice within \mic.h to euro tuich d e f a u l t .
24.

Tenant agro'ju to pursue reasonable conduct to pre-

vent: adverse p a r t i e s iron, gaining prescriptive r i g h t s and car VJ».K«U<::;
over the loused premises,
25/

This Loci no s h a l l bo interpreted in accordance \;ith

the la\:s of tho Soitc of Utah,
26.

All norices provided for in this Lease s h a l l be se::it:

To Landlordj

u4 South Main
RoiT«t:i£«l, Utah, 04010

To Tommt:

3431 ViOiit Alabama S t r e e t
Houston, Texas, 77000

and/or such ouher place or placed at-, hereafter s h a l l be designated
i n writing by the reripoctive parties*

Guch notice s h a l l bo r a i l e d

U.S. Registered or Certified mail, return receipt requested, po<:ta;;o
prepaid.
27*

Landlord covenants that Tenant, on payment of a l l the

aforesaid insralliaents and performing a l l Che covenants aforesaid,
s h a l l and may peacefully and'quietly have, hold and .enjoy thr; said
cJcxni«cd premises for the'term aforesaid,"
2G.

landlord and Xaviaat agree to execute, au uhe tiv.;s of

execution of this Lease or upon request by e i t h e r party, a short .tvrri.i
lease for recording purposes, as trains forth tho legal description of
the property, the term of this Le^cc: and reference* to the option to /
renevj the Le^se,
29.

The covenants, conditions and agreement;-, of this

Lease shrill bo binding upon and s h a l l inure to the benef i t of ,i:bo
h e i r s , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , successor,'; and assigns of tho parties h;r/L*o»
XM WX'f*:^^ WifJ)U3i0j', l:ht- urt::Lt:.s hereto have cause« -;:h;:se p:c\'«u.'.s
to be cwvoouued a l l ui! of the cay and year f i r s t ahov«? w r i t t e n ,

ftSCiftXT? nvr;v/j»r?::iv: ccvir:\i!Y, a
Utah Corporation
I

J'iV-si-.huu:
/v'in;»i.oru , ,

c & v) u^:<'.v:i/>a ;>:;:;u;iyy::7, «.
Liv.L&frt irarfaorshiip
/» Cn:/;r.;;. /'•;••: i.v.vr
..

ton:rat

.,

• i.'rr
"

Or V'£Ml,

, l

r.jj.\rt

I
: TA).

07 ISAVIG.

:

r.eicrc 13a 1221T21 L. ST/WIL^, who l.oj.r/^ r.y r..<J dalytfu-Oj-'nr.JU'. .•>:;•
tivit he is yrsjicurifc of Security Xnvi.uifciw::nfc CO^NUV/, and i.;,^ t;i%.
within tirid la-re^oin^ ir^t/ru^'jal; y^s si£,i.i:d iv; bc>.al£ u.\ uai.»5
Corporation by a u t h o r i t y oZ a r e s o l u t i o n o£ i t s Boaicd of ai/..-^.^..
and said Keith L. Stable duly ackoov/lcc^d Co i&o t h a t oaW Cor ; ,opt i o n executed the fla.uc a no t h a t ' t h e s e a l affixed ic tli«s a s a l o.L:
ooid Corporation.
A^'l$*M.t!&*^,tt1v^
• • Kotwy- Public . .

n e s : Bountiful, Utah
Cusu. E::p: Karen. l> 1972

caiwrir oi?

KARRIS.,

On thio £ g ^ d^y of \

, 9 ^ ^
r

X&VV****\J5^

~

k

, 197.^porsoiTtt).y

^v;rt uo bo a general pmrtiwi-

of C & K ^ u h a t t a n AotsooiatOB, a Limited Partnarshlp, who oxoou;:ad
tha within instrument and acknowledged that to executed the cams xo^
and on behalf of C & W Manhattan Acniociafcos as a general p a r t n e r .

Co;n, Exp^

jU^">

/

/%&

17)

— l!i~-

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

Beginning 3.14 chains South and C70.G4 feet East and 3.42 rods
north and East 04.7 feet from Northeast corner of Southwest Quarter of
Section 3G, Township 2 Horth, Range 1

Wcs

i , Salt Lake Meridian; thence

Southwesterly 401.1 feet along arc of TOO' curve to l e f t (Note: tang to
sd curve at its pt of beg. hairs South 20°5V West); thence East 837.54
feet; thence North 6.915 chains; thence West 605.3 feet to beginning.

EXHIBIT "A"
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EXHIBIT 11

V05/95

WINDING BROOK CORP

*er: RICK

Unit Detail Report

2:27 pro
Page:

•operty : K-MART/UOOOS CROSS/ 86 #3085

Comments

MAY

15,083.33
JUNE
15,083.33
JULY
15,083.33
AUGUST
15,083.33
SEPTEMBER
15,083.33
OCTOBER
5,416.69.: BALANi
BALANCE FOR OCTOBER DUE $9,666.64.
RESIDENTIAL MASTER INQUIRY OCCUPANT000007000

fOCCQ

5NG BROOK CORPUser: RICK

USR 00430

5

'05/95

WINDING BROOK CORP

*r: RICK

Unit Detail Report

2:27 pra
Page:

4

)perty : K-MART/WOO0S CROSS/ 86 #3085
it Ref No.
it Number
>e of Unit

: 162-1
: 1
: Current

'ororoon Area
lare Feet
ice Size
ail Size
:
ehouse Size ;
ling Height
e Vacated

Company Name
Address
Address
Monthly Base Rent

0.00000
84000

: K-MART #3085
: SHOPPING CENTER
WOODS CROSS, UT 84010
15,083.33
Building/Dept. No. :
0
Type of Heat

Utilities Info.
No. of Bathrooms
Kitchen
Flooring

: 0.00
: Yes

Comments
(1) TENANT PAYS PERCENTAGE RATE OF U OF SLAES IN EXCESS OF 8,250,000
UP TO 12,375,000 AND 1/2X IN EXCESS OF 12,375,000 UP TO 16,500.00.
TENANT MAY OFFSET ANY AMOUNTS PAID FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES IN EXCESS OF
28,160.
(2) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE MAINTENANCE INCLUDING
CLEANING/SWEEPING,SNOW REMOVAL/SANDING AND LOT LIGHTS/ELECTRICITY.
(3) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE BUILDING,LIABILITY AND RENTAL INSURANCE.
(4) TENANT HAS A TOTAL OF FIVE(5>- FIVE(5) YEAR OPTIONS 8 SAME TERMS
AND CONDITIONS, LEASE REQUIRES 180 DAYS PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE TO
LANDLORD.
(5)TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES.(SEE NOTE)
(6) GROUND LESSORS ARE ENTITLED TO THE FOLLOWING:
A. SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY
(K-*1W) (Po^ H-+)
C/O KEITH L. STAHLE
OVERAGE X 1/3 X 61.8%
?#2>%
84 SOUTH MAIN STREET
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010
B. WILLIAM K. -AMP BARBARA Lr-OLSON Tn«*jl*>e«+
420 &kc

W.

Co.

-2301 SOUTH MAIN STRCET
OVERAGE X 1/3 X 38.2%
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 (801) 295-3421

SALES SUMMARY AND CHECK IF ANY, SHOULD GO TO TENANT BY FEBRUARY 1.
NOTE: THE BILL FOR THE R.E. TAXES ON THE STAHLE'S PROPERTY(LG) GOES TO
KMART WHICH IS PAID BY KMART. THE BILL FOR THE OLSON'S PROPERTY GOES
TO OLSON WHICH IS THEN FORWARDED TO WINDING BROOK OFFICE. U.S. REALTY
86 PAYS AND BILLS KMART.
$ci-'-W In«*f*. CM.

O)

(7) ANNUAL GROUND LEASE PAYMENTS DUE 8/1 (STAHLE: $17,000.00 OLSON:
$10,500.00).
ftf»
Wal-f XoJ.n
(8) PERCENTAGE RENT DUE ON PIZZA HUT.

-1/3

TENANT PAID $111,000.00 FOR PAVING OF PARKING LOT;
CREDIT TOWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MONTHS:
MARCH
15,083.33
APRIL

>O

/ P v /•) u<;

15,083.33

p^\

f/jy

*l

USR

004PQ

- 7/23

886, 0T1-GI, K-MART #3085
Div.Code: 886
DivName: US Realty 86 Assoc.
Dnit#: UT1-01
Lessee: K-MART #3085
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS
Sq.Ftg.: 84,000
Contact:
Phone#: 801 292-7276
StartDate: 11/1/73
Term: 25 yrs.
EndDate: 11/30/98
Options: 5 x5yr.options
Init.Rent: 15,083.33
Escalation: x
Rnwl.Rent: x
%Rent: Sales>8,250,000-12,375,000
>>1%; 12,375,000-16.5 mill. >>0.5%
Taxes: see notes
Maint.Prov.by: landlord
CAM:
Utils:
Ins.Prov.by: landlord
Insurance:
LatePytFees:
Sec.Deposit:
Addressl: 3100 W.BIG BEAVER RD.
Address2:
City: TROY
State: MI
Zip: 48084
LocatedAt: 610 W.2600 SOUTH, WOODS
CROSS,

UT

84010

PropertySize(Acres):
No.Park• gSpaces:
BankName:
BankAcct#:
BankPhone#:
LenderName: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS
LoanAmt.:
716,740.70
Int.Rate: 0.00%

22 of 49
Management Report June 1995, Rick
Forte.
The following is a financial and
operational summary for the six
months ended June 30, 1995:
Woods Cross - Kmart paid rent f or
the months of January and
February totaling $30,166.66.
Kmart offset the rent for March
through June totaling $60,333.32
coded to parking lot repairs for
work they performed several years
ago. In July they resumed paying
the monthly rent of $15,083.33.
Percentage rents were received
from Pizza Hut $17,989.00 and
Kmart in the amount of $33,896.00.
Legal fees were paid to
Feinstein, Raiss totaling $3,000.
Real Estate Taxes for the Davis
County parcel were paid totaling
$6,388.55. Ground lessors were
paid their proportionate share of
overages totaling $4,316.00 and
$6,982.00. Additional lease
commissions were paid to Roebling
Management totaling $4,181.55 and
$15,000.00 to Pentad Properties.
Rent income for the six months
ended June 30 1995 consists of
rent receipts from Kmart totaling
$90,499.98, Pizza Hut $6,300.00
and MacFrugalls totaling
$38,819.02. MacFrugals rent offset
ended in May. Miscellaneous
expenses include work performed by
Triad Environmental totaling
$5,000.00 in January and February
for work performed in conjunction
with the opening of MacFrugals.

DueDate: Dec-uu
SecondLender: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS (1) TENANT PAYS PERCENTAGE RATE OF
1% OF SALES IN EXCESS OF
Bal.Amt.:
337,036.80
8,250,000 UP TO 12,375,000 AND
1/2% IN EXCESS OF 12,375,000 UP TO
16,500.00. TENANT MAY OFFSET ANY
AMOUNTS PAID FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES
IN EXCESS OF 28,160.
(2) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE
MAINTENANCE INCLUDING CLEANING
/SWEEPING, SNOW REMOVAL/SANDING
AND LOT LIGHTS/ELECTRICITY.
(3) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE
BUILDING, LIABILITY AND RENTAL
INSURANCE.
(4) TENANT HAS A TOTAL OF FIVE(5)FIVE(5) YEAR OPTIONS g SAME TERMS
AND CONDITIONS. LEASE REQUIRES f
180 DAYS PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE TO.:
LANDLORD.
~
}
(5) TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL
ESTATE TAXES. (SEE NOTE)
(6) GROUND LESSORS ARE ENTITLED TO
THE FOLLOWING;
A. SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY
C/O KEITH L. STAHLE, 64 SOUTH
MAIN STREET, BOUNTIFUL, UTAH
84010. >>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 61.8%
B. WILLIAM K. AND BARBARA L.
OLSON
2301 SWIM MAIN STREET,
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 (801)
295-3421
>>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 38.2%
SALES SUMMARY AND CHECK IF ANY,
SHOULD GO TO TENANT BY FEBRUARY 1.
NOTE: THE BILL FOR THE R.E. TAXES
ON THE STAHLE'S PROPERTY(LG) GOES
TO KMART WHICH IS PAID BY KMART.
THE BILL FOR THE OLSON'S PROPERTY
GOES TO OLSON WHICH IS THEN
FORWARDED TO WINDING BROOK OFFICE.

U.S. REALTY 86 PAYS AND BILLS
KMART.
(7) ANNUAL GROUND LEASE PAYMENTS
DUE 8/1 (STAHLE; $17,000.00 OLSON;
$10,500.00).
(8) PERCENTAGE RENT DUE ON PIZZA
HUT. TENANT PAID $111.000.00 FOR
PAVING OF PARKING LOT; CREDIT
TOWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MONTHS;
MARCH 15,083.33; APRIL 15,083.33;
MAY 15,083.33; JUNE 15,083.33;
JULY 15,083.33; AUGUST 15,083.33;
SEPTEMBER 15,083.33; OCTOBER
5,416.69. BALANCE FOR OCTOBER DUE
$9,666.64.

wI\DL\5 rFCOK IQR£

T/\.j'3Z

Detailed Rer.t Roll Report

Use.-. RICK
Property : K-WRT/HOGDS CROSS/ 66 #3085
162
N.WDQD5 CROSS, UTAH 64010

Report Date Fro« : 9/01/95

To : 3/30/35

Unit
Ref. Nuwoer

Deposits
Held

Current
Balance

1

Occupant
Name and Address

K-MftRT *5t>85

0.00

-revious
Balance
SO^ 333.3e

60r3:3.-s2
15,083.33 Monthly Pent
(15,063.33; Pymt. Bat en 595 Check 91435<T

SHOPPIN6 CENTER
W30DS CROSS, UT 84010

PIZZA HIT

0.00

0.00

1,050.00
1,050.00 Monthly Rent

610 W. dSOO SOUTH
WOODS CROSS, UT 64010
PNS STORES 'WftC FRILL'S)
610 WEST 2600 SOUTH
MOOTS CROSS, UT

— Transacti:n= in Selected Range
Amount
description

0.00

11,665.28

12,495.28
6.633.75 Monthly Rer.t
(7,243.75) *ynt. Batch 595 Cheer 03152056
1,220.00 Coawon Area Maintenance

\/ A C ft N T

usRnrvun

Iteer: RICK

Detailed Rent Ro/i Report

'Property : K-mftRT/WOODS CROSS/ 6b #3085
162
N.WOODS CROSS, UTAH 8*010
Unit
Ref. Nup&er

P P0 P E RT Y

Occupant
Name arid Address

Fecort Date r ro« : 5/GS/35

To : 9/30/35

Deposits
Held

Current
Balance

Previous
Ealance

T0 T A L
RNT
CAM

fontnly
Rent
Coawon Area Maintenance

££'.767.08
1,220.00

Total Current Charges
Previous Balance
Cash Received
Checks Removed
Deposits Forfeited
NSF Checks
Deposits Decreased
Open Credits Refunded

23,987.08
72, £18. GO
(22,327.08)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Accounts Receivable Balance
Security Deposits Held

73,878,60
0.00

Pace:

Transactions i*« Selected Rcr.re
Hmoant
Description

8 8 6 , UT1-01, K-MART #3085
D i v . C o d e : 886
DivNarue: US R e a l t y 86 A s s o c .
U n i t * : UT1-01
Lessee: K-MART #3085
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS
Sq.Ftg.: 84,000
Contact:
Phone#: 801 292-7276
StartDate: 11/1/73
Terra: 25 yrs.
EndDate: 11/30/98
Options: 5 x5yr.options
Init.Rent: 15,083.33
Escalation: x
Rnwl.Rent: x
%Rent: Sales>8,250,000-12,375,000
>>1%; 12,375,000-16.5 mill. >>0.5%
Taxes: see notes
Maint.Prov.by: landlord
CAM:
Utile:
Ins.Prov.by: landlord
Insurance:
LatePytFees:
Sec.Deposit:
Addressl: 3100 W.BIG BEAVER RD.
Adcress2:
City: TROY
State: MI
Zip: 48084
LocatedAt: 610 W.2600 SOUTH, WOODS
CROSS, UT 84010
PropertySize(Acres):
No.Park•gSpaces:
BankName:
BankAcct#:
BankPhone#:
LenderName: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS
LoanAmt.:
716,740.70
Int.Rate: 0,00%

22 of 49
Management Report June 19 95, Rick
Forte.
The following is a financial and
operational summary for the six
months ended June 30, 1995:
Woods Cross - Kmart paid rent f or
the months of January and
February totaling $30,166.66.
Kmart offset the rent for March
through June totaling $60,333.32
coded to parking lot repairs for
work they performed several years
ago. In July they resumed paying
the monthly rent of $15,083.33.
Percentage rents were received
from Pizza Hut $17,9 89.00 and
Kmart in the amount of $33,896.00.
Legal fees were paid to
Feinstein, Raiss totaling $3,000.
Real Estate Taxes for the Davis
County parcel were paid totaling
$6,388.55. Ground lessors were
paid their proportionate share of
overages totaling $4,316.00 and
$6,982.00. Additional lease
commissions were paid to Roebling
Management totaling $4,181.55 and
$15,000.00 to Pentad Properties.
Rent income for the six ^ jnths
ended June 30 1995 consists of
rent receipts from Kmart totaling
$90,499.98, Pizza Hut $6,300.00
and MacFrugalls totaling
$38,819.02. MacFrugals rent offset
ended in May. Miscellaneous
expenses include work performed by
Triad Environmental totaling
$5,000.00 in January and February
for work performed in conjunction
with the opening of MacFrugals.

USR 004.? 1

DueDate: Dec-00
SecondLender: WASHINGTON NAT'L INS (1) TENANT PAYS PERCENTAGE RATE OF
1% OF SALES IN EXCESS OF
Bal.Amt.:
337,036.80
8,250,000 UP TO 12,375,000 AND
1/2% IN EXCESS OF 12,375,000 UP TO
16,500.00. TENANT MAY OFFSET ANY
AMOUNTS PAID FOR REAL ESTATE TAXES
IN EXCESS OF 28,160.
(2) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE
MAINTENANCE INCLUDING CLEANING
/SWEEPING, SNOW REMOVAL/SANDING
AND LOT LIGHTS/ELECTRICITY.
(3) LANDLORD SHALL PROVIDE
BUILDING, LIABILITY AND RENTAL
INSURANCE.
(4) TENANT HAS A TOTAL OF FIVE(5)FIVE(5) YEAR OPTIONS § SAME TERMS
AND CONDITIONS. LEASE REQUIRES
180 DAYS PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE TO
LANDLORD.
(5) TENANT RESPONSIBLE FOR REAL
ESTATE TAXES. (SEE NOTE)
(6) GROUND LESSORS ARE ENTITLED TO
THE FOLLOWING:
A. SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY
C/O KEITH L. STAHLE, 64 SOUTH
MAIN STREET, BOUNTIFUL, UTAH
84010. >>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 61.8%
B. WILLIAM K. AND BARBARA L.
OLSON
2301 SWIM MAIN STREET,
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 (801)
295-3421
>>>OVERAGE X 1/3 X 38.2%
SALES SUMMARY AND CHECK IF ANY,
SHOULD GO TO TENANT BY FEBRUARY 1.
NOTE: THE BILL FOR THE R.E. TAXES
ON THE STAHLE'S PROPERTY(LG) GOES
TO KMART WHICH IS PAID BY KMART.
THE BILL FOR THE OLSON'S PROPERTY
GOES TO OLSON WHICH IS THEN
FORWARDED TO WINDING BROOK OFFICE.

U.S. REALTY 86 PAYS AND BILLS
KMART.
(7) ANNUAL GROUND LEASE PAYMENTS
DUE 8/1 (STAHLE: $17,000.00 OLSON:"
$10,500.00).
(8) PERCENTAGE RENT DUE ON PIZZA
HUT. TENANT PAID $111.000.00 FOR
PAVING OF PARKING LOT; CREDIT
TOWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MONTHS:
MARCH 15,083.33; APRIL 15,083.33;
MAY 15,083.33; JUNE~ 15, 083 .33;
JULY 15,083.33; AUGUST 15,083.33;
SEPTEMBER 15,083.33; OCTOBER
5,416.69. BALANCE FOR OCTOBER DUE
_________

USR 00433

886, UT1-02, PIZZA HUT
Div.Code: 886
DivName: US Realty 86 Assoc.
Unit#: UT1-02
Lessee: PIZZA HUT
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS
Sq.Ftg.: 15,000
Contact:
Phonet:
StartDate: 7/10/74
Term: 20 yrs.
EndDate: 7/9/94
Options: 2 x5yr.options
Init.Rent: 1,050.00
Escalation: x
Rnwl.Rent: x
%Rent: Difference betw, annual
rent and 7% of gross sales
Taxes:
Maint.Prov•by:
CAM:
Utils:
Ins.Prov.by:
Insurance:
LatePytFees:
Sec.Deposit:
Addressl: 9111 E.DOUGLAS
Address2: P.O.BOX 428
City: WICHITA
State: KS
Zip: 67201
LocatedAt: 610 W.2600 SOUTH, WOODS
CROSS, UT 84010
PropertySize(Acres):
No.Park•gSpaces:
BankName:
BankAcct#:
BankPhone#:
LenderName:
LoanAmt.:
Int.Rate:
DueDate:
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SecondLender:
Bal.Amt.:

USR 00435

886, UT1-03, PNS STORES (MAC FRUGAL'S)
Div.Code: 886
DivName: US Realty 86 Assoc.
Unit*: UT1-03
Lessee: PNS STORES (MAC FRUGAL*S)
TradingAs: UTAH, WOODS CROSS
Sq.Ftg.:
Contact:
Phone*:
StartDate:
Term:
EndDate:
Options:
Init.Rent:
Escalation:
Rnwl. Rent:
%Rent:
Taxes:
Maint.Prov.by:
CAM:
Utils:
Ins.Prov.by:
Insurance:
LatePytFees:
Sec.Deposit:
Addressl: 612 W.2600 SOUTH
Address2:
City: N.WOODS CROSS
State: UT
Zip: 84010
LocatedAt:
PropertySize(Acres):
No.Park• gSpaces:
BankName:
BankAcct#:
BankPhone#:
LenderName:
LoanAmt.:
Int.Rate:
DueDate:
SecondLender:
Bal.Arat.:
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EXHIBIT 13

U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES
c/o

GARDEN COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078
Phone: (973) 467-5000, Extension 200
Facsimile: (973) 467-3480

April 17,1998

VTA CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.R.

Mr. William Olson
2301 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Re:

U.S. Realty 86 Associates - Exercise of Ground Lease Option
Premises: Woods Cross, Utah

Dear Mr. Olson:
This letter shall confirm that U.S. Realty 86 Associates is exercising the option to extend the
term of the subject Ground Lease for an additional five (5) years. The new term shall run from
August 1, 1998 through July 31, 2003. U.S. Realty 86 Associates will commence paying the
new yearly ground rent of 512,600.00 on August 1, 1998. U.S. Realty 86 Associates will, of
course, continue to remit the appropriate portion of any percentage rents received from Kmart
and any other subtenants located on the subject property.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
Very truly yours,
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES

MARK A. HOFFMAN
MAH/dla
cc:

Mark Wilf

U your RETURN ADDRESS completed on the reveree elde?

Z MSN 0 0 1

b^a

US Postal Service

Receipt for Certified Mail
No Insurance Coverage Provided.
Do not use for International Mail (See reverse)

f&* William Olson
Street & Number

2301 South Main Street
Post Ofica, Stala, t ZIP Coda

BnnnHfnl, flf.ah
Postage
Certified Fee
Special Detivery Fee
Restricted OefvaryFae
Return Receipt Shoving to
Whom i Date Delvered
flcUn Receipt ShowingtoNtaftj
Address

2 Oato, I kkktstft

o
o

TOTAL Postage* Fees

CO
CO

PostmiffcorOaJe

4/17/98
Thank you for using Return Receipt Service

84010.

U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES
c/o

GARDEN COMMERCTAL PROPERTIES
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078
Phone: (973) 467-5000, Extension 200
Facsimile: (973) 467-3480

April 17, 1998

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.H

Mr. Walt Johnson
Security Investment Company
c/o Keith Stahle
84 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Re:

U.S. Realty 86 Associates - Exercise of Ground Lease Option
Premises: Woods Cross, Utah

Dear Mr. Johnson:
This letter shall confirm that U.S. Realty 86 Associates is exercising the option to extend the
term of the subject Ground Lease for an additional five (5) years. The new term shall run from
August I, 1998 through July 31, 2003- U.S. Realty 86 Associates will commence paying the
new yearly ground rent of 520,400.00 on August 1, 1998. U.S. Realty S6 Associates will, of
course, continue to remit the appropriate portion of any percentage rents received from Kmart
and any other subtenants located on the subject property.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
Very truly yours,
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES

MARK A. HOFFMAN
MAH/dla
cc:

Mark Wilf
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3. Artde Addressed to:

eg

c/o Keith Stahle

Mr .\ Walt Johnson
a
Security Investment Conpany

"I

84 South Main Street
51 Bountiful, Utah 84010
2
5. Received By: (Print Nam*)

a

I also wish to receive the
following services (for an
extra fee):
1. D Addressee's Address
Z O Restricted Delivery
Consult postmaster for fee.

4a. Artide Number

Z 454 001 691
4b. Service Type
a Registered
X2XCertifled
D Express Mai
D Insured
DrktumRe9aiptforMe^handse J COD
7. Date

Zte.

8. Addressee's Address (OiInto if/
and fe* la paid)

6. Signatu^a: (Addrassaa orAgentLS
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , December 1994

io2S9$-97.€wi79 Domestic Return Receipt

EXHIBIT 15

SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD
84 South Main
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010
Phone: (801) 295-3351
July 8,

1998

U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES
820 Morris Turnpike Suite 201
Short Hills, New Jersey
07078
ATTENTION;

Mark Hoffman

Dear Mr* Hoffman:
Please find enclosed the bill for sewer service to the K-Mart
property in Woods Cross, Utah, covering the period from 1-1-98 to
12-31-98. Payment should be remitted directly to the South Davis
County Sewer Improvement District as has been done in the past*
We belive the road work which was being done on the property is
now about complete, and are pleased with the results as we hope
you are. It looks as though we can soon conclude the matter and
have asked our Attorney to contact you to see what needs to be
done. Best regards.
Very truly yours,

Nora A. Stahle, Partner

EXHIBIT 18

S i b l M UJjfcKJJN'b
2301 SOUTH MAIN / BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010
PHONE (801) 295-3421

July 15, 1998

US Realty 86 Association
c/o Garden Commercial Properties
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078
Attn: Mark A. Hoffman

Dear: Mr. Hoffman,
Today I was advised by Attorney George Fadel that you had called him concerning a short
amendment to the lease of August 17, 1972.
In reviewing the ground lease with Mr. Fadel, it appears from paragraph 22 V , of the ground
leasethat all of the options granted shall be exercised by notice in writing to the landlord, given
no later than 150 days prior to the expiration of the then existing lease term and in the manner
here and after provided. The existing term expires on July 31, 1998. Notice in writing should
have been given no later than March 3, 1998. Your letter to me is dated April 17, 1998. Only 106
days notice had been given.
In as much as there would have to be an amendment, if I were to wave the 150 days notice I
believe it only fair and reasonable that we adjust the rental to conform more closely to present
market value. I would emphasize that I would intend to be reasonable.
Since the time is short I would welcome immediate negotiations for the terms of renewal on the
lease. However I would like you to understand, that at this time, no further options for renewal
exist under the ground lease of August 17, 1972.

Sincerely,

William K. Olson
Slim Olsons

EXHIBIT 19

SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD.
84 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
July 17, 1998
U.S. REALTY 86 ASSOCIATES
%GARDEN COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES
820 Morris Turnpike, Suite 102
Short Hills, New" Jersey 07078
ATTENTION: MR. MARK A. HOFFMAN
Re: Ground Lease premises, Woods Cross, Utah.
Dear Mr. Hoffman:
The ground lease dated August 17, 1972, wherein Security
Investment Company is named as Landlord and C & W MANHATTAN
ASSOCIATES is name as Tenant , provides that options for extension
of the term of the lease be exercised by notice in writing to the
Landlord given not later than one hundred fifty (150) days prior
to the expiration of the then-existing lease term. Security
Investment LTD. is now the Landlord having succeeded to the interest
of Security Investment Company.
Security Investment Ltd. now advises you that the option
not having been properly exercised, the lease terminates on August
1, 1998. All opti as are accordingly terminated.
Rental on a month-to-month basis will be $24,000.00
per month commencing August 1, 1998, and either party may cancel
by notice served upon the other fifteen days before the end of
any month. Payment of $24,000.00 on August 1, 1998, and the
acceptance thereof by Security Investment Ltd. will in no way
be a waiver of the strict terms of the option contained in the
ground lease.
We assume that you will timely advise any subtenants
of the termination and the contents of this letter.
Very truly yours,
Security Investment Ltd.

